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THE "TEST'-OR LACK THEREOF-FOR ISSUANCE OF
VIRGINIA TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS: THE CURRENT
UNCERTAINTY AND A RECOMMENDED APPROACH
BASED ON FEDERAL PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
LAW
The Honorable David W. Lannetti *
"It is difficult for attorneys to counsel their clients and predict
the way a judge may rule when the legal principles on which the
court must base its discretion are unclear, ambiguous, and rife
with contradiction."'
INTRODUCTION
Preliminary injunctive relief, where a movant2 is awarded a
court order prior to final judgment on the merits of a dispute,
serves a necessary role in equity jurisprudence. Courts typically
state that preliminary relief is an extraordinary remedy designed
to preserve the status quo, with some courts opining that this
* Judge, Fourth Judicial Circuit of Virginia. Adjunct Professor, Marshall-Wythe
School of Law at the College of William & Mary and Regent University Law School. The
views advanced in this article represent commentary "concerning the law, the legal sys-
tem, [and] the administration of justice" as authorized by Virginia Canon of Judicial Con-
duct 4(B) (permitting judges to "speak, write, lecture, teach" and otherwise participate in
extrajudicial efforts to improve the legal system). These views therefore should not be mis-
taken for the official views of the Norfolk Circuit Court or the author's opinion as a circuit
court judge in the context of any specific case. The author thanks 2014-15 Norfolk Circuit
Court Law Clerks Jennifer Eaton and Gregory Chakmakas for their assistance in the re-
search for and editing of this article.
1. Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform
Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 532-33 (2003). When Judge Denlow wrote this
about the state of preliminary injunction law, he had been a federal Magistrate Judge for
seven years. Hon. Morton Denlow (Ret.), JAMS, www.jamsadr.com/denlow/ (last visited
Oct. 1, 2015).
2. In this article, "movant" refers to the party requesting preliminary injunctive re-
lief. It is meant to have the same meaning as "movant," "petitioner," or "plaintiff' as used
in other articles pertaining to federal preliminary injunctions and Virginia temporary in-
junctions.
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purpose simply describes the abstract goal of preliminary relief
and others holding that movants must satisfy a higher burden
when seeking injunctions that alter the status quo.4 After signifi-
cant evolution, federal courts developed a four-part test for pre-
liminary injunctions,' which the circuit courts of appeals have
universally accepted but inconsistently applied.6 The Supreme
Court of the United States subsequently resolved this circuit split
in part,7 yet the circuit courts still adhere to different approaches
when applying the test.8
Virginia has no established test for its equivalent of the federal
preliminary injunction, the temporary injunction. Some Virginia
courts have used the federal preliminary injunction test, as inter-
preted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, when evaluating petitions for Virginia temporary injunc-
tions-relying on Virginia precedent that looked to federal law
when Virginia law was silent.9 The Supreme Court of Virginia
has never affirmed this approach, however. Indeed, when provid-
ed an opportunity to adopt the federal test for Virginia temporary
injunctions, the court specifically opted not to express its view.' °
With the inconsistencies regarding interpretation of federal
preliminary injunction law-as to both the role of preserving the
status quo and interpretation of the four-part test-and the un-
certainty regarding whether federal preliminary injunction juris-
prudence should guide Virginia courts when evaluating Virginia
temporary injunctions, Virginia litigants understandably are con-
fused. Although the absence of a clear test for issuance of a Vir-
ginia temporary injunction arguably preserves the court's tradi-
tional broad discretion to dole out equitable relief as it deems fair
and just, litigants may be ill prepared to address any judicial con-
3. See Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 109, 110, 113, 115 (2001).
4. See id. at 115.
5. Id. at 111.
6. See Bethany M. Bates, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for Preliminary
Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522, 1529-30 (2011).
7. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20-24 (2008).
8. See Bates, supra note 6, at 1523, 1535-37.
9. See, e.g., HotJobs.com, Ltd. v. Digital City, Inc., 53 Va. Cir. 36 (2000) (Fairfax
County); see also infra Part III.C.




cerns without clear guidance. When presented with the proper
opportunity, the Supreme Court of Virginia should consider indi-
cating what Virginia trial courts should analyze when evaluating
a petition for-and what litigants should expect to argue when
seeking-a temporary injunction. Current federal preliminary in-
junction jurisprudence offers a sound launching point for estab-
lishing a test for Virginia temporary injunctions.
Part I of this article highlights the need for preliminary relief,
explains the historical discretion granted the chancellor in equity,
and points out the disadvantages of unfettered equitable discre-
tion. Part II discusses the evolution of evaluating the need for
preliminary injunctions in federal court, including the develop-
ment and interpretation of the four-part test used by modern fed-
eral courts. Part III reviews the evolution of temporary injunc-
tions in Virginia, including reliance by some Virginia lower courts
on federal preliminary injunction jurisprudence, and the current
uncertainty regarding temporary injunction law. Finally, Part IV
recommends an approach the Supreme Court of Virginia should
consider adopting: an analysis that is independent of the status
quo, consistent with preliminary injunctive relief being an ex-
traordinary remedy, and loyal to each requirement the movant
must independently satisfy under the federal preliminary injunc-
tion four-part test.
Under the recommended test for a Virginia temporary injunc-
tion, the movant must establish that: (1) he has more than a 50%
likelihood of succeeding at the trial on the merits, i.e., receiving a
permanent injunction; (2) he has more than a 50% probability of
suffering irreparable harm prior to the trial on the merits if the
temporary injunction is not granted; (3) the harm to the movant
prior to the trial on the merits if the temporary injunction is not
granted is greater that the harm to the non-movant prior to the
trial on the merits if the temporary injunction is granted; and (4)
the public interest does not outweigh the possible irreparable
harm to the movant prior to the trial on the merits if the tempo-
rary injunction is not granted.
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I. THE NEED FOR PRELIMINARY RELIEF
Injunctive relief, which is designed to address potential injuries
where compensation via money damages is inadequate,11 has
played-and continues to play-a key role in American law.12 Mo-
vants often require judicial relief in order to prevent irreparable
injury and cannot wait the months or the years necessary to fully
litigate a request for permanent injunctive relief.3 Equity courts
responded to this need by allowing interim relief, enforceable
against the non-movant via the court's contempt power, very
shortly after a dispute arises and without a trial on the merits of
the dispute.4 Preliminary injunctive relief, therefore, has been re-
ferred to as "one of the most important tools at the disposal of at-
torneys."'5 Such relief has been applied in a diversity of contexts,
including enforcement of legislation, mergers and acquisitions,
covenants not to compete, violations of civil rights and liberties,
domestic abuse, environmental concerns, strikes, elections, intel-
lectual property rights, property and zoning disputes, and school
children rights."
11. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 2.1(1),
at 58 (2d ed. 1993); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 380 (4th ed. 2010) [hereinafter LAYCOCK, CASES AND MATERIALS] ("It is horn-
book law that equity will not act if there is an adequate remedy at law.").
12. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 11, § 1.3, at 13 ("Preliminary injunctions.., have a
wide potential both for averting and for causing harm."); see also LAYCOCK, CASES AND
MATERIALS, supra note 11, at 310-16 (discussing "structural" injunctions "designed to cor-
rect institutional structures operating in systematic violation of applicable law" and
providing school desegregation as an example); Rachel A. Weisshaar, Hazy Shades of Win-
ter: Resolving the Circuit Split over Preliminary Injunctions, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1012
(2012) (describing a preliminary injunction as an "extraordinarily powerful remedy").
13. See John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV.
525, 541 (1978) ("If [a court] does not grant prompt relief, the [movant] may suffer a loss of
his lawful rights that no later remedy can restore. But if the court does grant immediate
relief, the [non-movant] may sustain precisely the same loss of his rights.").
14. See Denlow, supra note 1, at 534 ("A motion for a preliminary injunction entitles a
party to priority on the court's calendar and also gives the [movant] an element of sur-
prise.").
15. Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunction Standards in Massachusetts State and
Federal Courts, 35 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 4 (2013) [hereinafter Wolf, Massachusetts
Standards].
16. See, e.g., Denlow, supra note 1, at 496; Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 525; Wolf,
Massachusetts Standards, supra note 15, at 4; Weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1014.
[Vol. 50:273
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A. The Concept of Irreparable Injury
Preliminary injunctive relief necessarily bypasses the due pro-
cess normally accorded a non-movant, as a remedy is awarded be-
fore a trial on the merits.7 With the sacrifice of due process comes
the risk of error.8 On the one hand, the court might deny a pre-
liminary injunction petition and subsequently realize at trial that
an injunction was warranted, potentially forcing the movant to
incur irreparable injury during the pre-trial period absent an in-
junction. s On the other hand, the court might grant a prelimi-
nary injunction and realize at trial that the injunction was not
warranted, demonstrating that the non-movant was wrongfully
enjoined while the injunction was in effect.2 ° Courts have re-
sponded to these risks of error by allowing the movant to seek
money damages for an erroneous denial of preliminary relief"' and
by requiring the movant to post an injunction bond that is availa-
ble to compensate the non-movant for the wrongful enjoinment
concomitant with an erroneous grant of preliminary relief.22 An
erroneously granted preliminary injunction is especially signifi-
cant, as the non-movant's liberty is restrained improperly under
the threat of immediate judicial enforcement, including impris-
onment." As a result of, inter alia, the lack of full due process and
17. See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 1.3, at 12-14.
18. See id.; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 541 ("The danger of incorrect prelim-
inary assessment is the key to the analysis of [preliminary] relief."). "[R]econciling the
need for interim relief with the restriction of freedom that it imposes is the proper focus of
the search for appropriate criteria governing interlocutory injunctions." Wolf, Massachu-
setts Standards, supra note 15, at 6.
19. See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 1.3, at 12-14.
20. See id.
21. See LAYCOCK, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 11, at 300 ("[W]here it is possible
to prevent harm by injunction, the court can prevent it, or let it happen and compensate
for it."). Although compensatory damages potentially are available to "compensate" the
movant in such a situation, the movant who unsuccessfully sought preliminary injunctive
relief may have been irreparably harmed prior to the issuance of the permanent injunc-
tion, making the available damages inadequate as a matter of law; nevertheless, at that
point damages are the best that the law can provide.
22. See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 2.11(3), at 263-65.
23. See LAYCOCK, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 11, at 381 (pointing out that an
injunction intrudes on the defendant's liberty "because the injunction orders him to do or
refrain from specified conduct" and "because the injunction can be enforced by coercive or
punitive measures, including imprisonment"); see also Wolf, Massachusetts Standards,
supra note 15, at 6 ("[T]he American legal system operates on the assumption that indi-
viduals ... are free to act as they please until they have been adjudged liable for injury to
another. Interim relief is inconsistent with this basic premise because it restricts freedom
of action without a final judgment of liability.").
2015]
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the potential impact on individual liberty, preliminary injunctive
relief often is referred to as an extraordinary remedy.4
B. The Historical Discretion of the Chancellor
Centuries ago in England, the commom-law courts, known as
the King's Courts, were granted subject matter jurisdiction based
on the King's Writs and could award only damages as a remedy
for a wrong.25 As the needs of English communities continued to
grow, the jurisdictional limits of the writ system were frequently
reached, resulting in the creation of new writs.26 The common law
subsequently became more rigid and the realm of disputes ex-
panded, resulting in many wrongs being unredressable by the
King's Courts because they did not fall within the stringent writ
system.27 In response, equitable modification of the law, adminis-
tered via royal discretion, filled this void.28
This equitable system, which was administered by the King's
chancellor, developed outside the sphere of the common law. 9 Pe-
titioners appealed to the chancellor's conscience.3" Unconstrained
by an inflexible writ system or its equivalent, the chancellor could
hear disputes and resolve them as he saw fit, doing what-in his
mind and based on his morals-was fair and just under the cir-
cumstances.31 Although the King normally appointed ecclesiasti-
24. See Weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1021-22. Equitable relief in general historically
has been referred to as an extraordinary remedy because one could petition the chancellor
for relief only after availing oneself of all legal remedies, i.e., proving that there was no
adequate remedy at law. Id.
25. See Susan H. Black, A New Look at Preliminary Injunctions: Can Principles from
the Past Offer Any Guidelines to Decisionmakers in the Future?, 36 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3
(1984).
26. See id.; see also DOBBS, supra note 11, § 2.2, at 67 ("When the [movant] came to
the chancery for help with an unusual set of facts to which the old writs did not fit, the
chancellor sometimes issued a new kind of writ.").
27. See Black, supra note 25, at 3.
28. See id. at 4.
29. See id.
30. See LAYCOCK, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 11, at 307 ("There is long tradi-
tion that a suit in equity is an appeal to the chancellor's conscience.").
31. See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 2.1(1), at 57 ("Even if a [movant] makes out a case for
relief according to all the preexisting rules, the court of equity may in its discretion refuse
its aid. Equity courts saw their discretion as a reflection of their flexibility and as a means
to justice apart from law."); see also id. ("Discretion as to equitable remedies goes beyond
the power to deny relief; it extends as well to the power of shaping relief, determining its
extent, scope, and particular incidents.").
[Vol. 50:273
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cal and religious individuals to fill the position of chancellor,32 the
role eventually shifted to legal professionals.3 This system of re-
solving disputes outside the writ system was formalized later as a
separate body of law, which became known as equity.34
Conflict between the common-law courts and the chancellor
soon developed, with the courts charging the chancellor with "at-
tempting to subvert the whole law of England by substituting
conscience for definite rule."35 A primary area of conflict was in
the injunction arena.6 Because common-law courts could award
only damages, they could provide a remedy after a wrong was
committed but had no authority to prevent the wrong from occur-
ring in the first place.7 Injunctions therefore became the province
of the chancellor, although there was a great deal of uncertainty
regarding the standard to be used for issuance of preliminary in-
junctions.38
The notion of a special framework for preliminary injunctions
developed under English law during the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries." American equitable jurisprudence-including
preliminary injunctive relief law-was imported from England
when colonists crossed the Atlantic Ocean.4" The U.S. Supreme
Court codified parts of English law as early as 1792, when rules
were adopted stating that English equity practice would guide
32. See id. § 2.2, at 68 (describing the medieval chancellor as "a member of the Coun-
cil [who] sat with other lords of the realm," "a prelate with the weight of the church behind
him," and "the king's right hand man [who] acted in the king's name on many occasions").
33. See id. § 2.2, at 70 ("[B]y the 15th century the chancellor was clearly a judge, rec-
ognized as such and acting as such: he was.., acting without specific authority from the
king to hear the particular case."); see also id. § 2.2, at 71 ("The chancellors were mostly
churchmen until after Henry VIII put Thomas More's head on a pike."). Although actual
chancellors no longer hear equity cases, judges hearing equity cases sometimes are re-
ferred to as "chancellors," and "there is still much talk about the flexibility of equity and
the discretion of trial judges in equity cases." LAYCOCK, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note
11, at 307.




38. See id. at 5.
39. See Lee, supra note 3, at 126.
40. See generally Black, supra note 25, at 9-10.
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the Court's proceedings.4' American courts continue to rely on
English equity practice and its principles.2
C. The Inherent Uncertainty of Equitable Discretion
At first blush, the power to fashion equitable remedies-to do
what is fair and just-appears to be a noble and desirable avenue
of relief.4" The reality, however, is that there often is no consensus
regarding what is fair and just; hence, results from courts of equi-
ty can be unpredictable, uncertain, and inconsistent.44
The quest for consistency in early equity practice led to the evo-
lution of general equity principles and, in some cases, more struc-
tured equitable guideposts and maxims.45 The focus then turned
41. See Wolf, Massachusetts Standards, supra note 15, at 17 & n.109 (citing Georgia
v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 411-14 (1792)). The Court subsequently enacted Federal
Equity Rules that "directed the lower federal courts to employ the 'practice of the High
Court of Chancery in England' to fill the gaps in the law governing federal equity jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 17 (citation omitted). With respect to the various states, "[]acking both coher-
ent native analysis and the stream of diverse cases that fostered the evolution of the law
in England, many authorities sought to follow the English precedents and treatises."
Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 538.
42. See Wolf, Massachusetts Standards, supra note 15, at 19 ("[The Supreme Court
still relies on English equity practice, including principles extant at the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution in 1788 and the enactment of the first Judiciary Act in 1789.").
43. See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 2.4(1), at 92 ("[Discretion] makes possible decisions
that are flexible, intuitive, and tailored to the particular case.").
44. See id. ("[Discretion] also makes possible decisions that are unanalyzed, unex-
plained, and un-thoughtful."); see also id. § 2.2, at 71 (recalling "the most famous of all
comments about equity, the conscience of chancellors was as apt to vary as the length of
their feet"); Jacob S. Crawford, Unlikely to Succeed: How the Second Circuit's Adherence to
the Serious Questions Standard for the Granting of Preliminary Injunctions Contradicts
Supreme Court Precedent and Thrns an Extraordinary Remedy into an Ordinary One, 64
OKLA. L. REV. 437, 441 (2012) ('The sometimes harsh remedies of equity were imposed
with little regard to consistency as well as little to no mechanisms for keeping in check the
personal agendas of the Chancellors."); cf. LAYCOCK, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 11,
§ 2.4(1), at 308 ("Courts of last resort have frequently reiterated that equitable discretion
is discretion to consider all of the relevant facts, not discretion for the trial judge to do
whatever he wants.").
45. See generally Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 527-40 (discussing the evolution of eq-
uity analysis from a strict standard to a general standard); see also id. at 528 (noting that
early chancellors and commentators "were more concerned with the substantive principles
created to correct defective rules of law than with the special procedures and remedies
available in equity"); id. at 527-28 (providing that during the eighteenth century "[t]he
existence of irreparable injury and the strength of the [movant's] case influenced deci-
sions, and there [were] hints of what would develop into the balance of convenience and a
concern for preserving the status quo"); Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: The Var-
ying Standards, 7 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 173, 177 (1984) (discussing guideposts provided




toward the tension between the traditional flexibility inherent in
equitable practice and the rigidity of proposed equitable stand-
ards and rules, a tension that continues even today.46 Justice
Ginsburg nevertheless pointed out as recently as 2008 that the
essence of equity jurisdiction is flexibility and, specifically, the
chancellor's authority "to do equity" and fashion appropriate re-
lief for each particular case.4" Modern Chancellors, including
judges presiding over equity cases, retain traditional equitable
discretion, albeit largely within the bounds of an equitable
framework that includes accepted rules and tests.4"
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION LAW
Statutory guidance for the issuance of federal preliminary in-
junctive relief-in the form of both preliminary injunctions and
short-term ex parte temporary restraining orders-is contained in
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.49 Rule 65 provides
requirements for notice to the non-movant prior to a preliminary
injunction hearing, consolidation of the preliminary hearing with
the trial on the merits, security to be provided to the court in case
a preliminary injunction is awarded erroneously, and contents of
the injunction." Although the federal rule provides a basic proce-
46. See Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 532 (pointing out that with the increased demand
for injunctions during the nineteenth century and the need for uniformity among the in-
creasing number of chancellors, it was "necessary to evolve principles for guiding injunc-
tive decisions" and that "[t]he turn to general principles merged with the trend to restrain
equity's discretion by rules"); cf. Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of
Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485, 546 (2010) ("Equitable balancing is a decidedly modern phe-
nomenon that was first employed after the Civil War and that became accepted in the ear-
ly part of the twentieth century to give judges discretion to excuse violations of common
law duties when courts concluded that a doctrine was needed to avoid issuing economically
inefficient injuntions.").
47. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 51 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)).
48. See, e.g., Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189,
193 (4th Cir. 1977) ("A judge's discretion is not boundless and must be exercised within
the applicable rules of law or equity."), overruled on other grounds by The Real Truth
About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other
grounds, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), aff'd, The Real
Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curi-
am).
49. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. Promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was statu-
torily authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2072 and 28 U.S.C. § 1072. With respect to federal prelim-
inary injunctive relief, this article focuses on preliminary injunctions and does not address
temporary restraining orders.
50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a), (c).
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dural structure for petitioners to acquire preliminary injunctive
relief, there is no express language describing the required analy-
sis by which courts should determine whether to issue a prelimi-
nary injunction.51 The injunctive relief evaluation and the ulti-
mate decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction therefore
rest soundly upon the court's discretion and are based on English
and early American equitable principles.2
A. Preserving the Status Quo
It has long been stated that the purpose of preliminary relief,
and specifically of federal preliminary injunctions, is to preserve
the status quo.53 Although the definition of the status quo is sub-
ject to interpretation, it most commonly refers to the current
state of affairs.54 An injunction that commands the non-movant to
perform a certain act or acts, known as a mandatory injunction,
therefore alters the status quo.55 Conversely, an injunction that
prohibits the non-movant from acting, known as a prohibitory in-
junction, does not disturb the status quo.56 Importantly, the prem-
ise that the movant always seeks to preserve the status quo
through preliminary injunctive relief is flawed, as the movant
may seek to alter the current situation.57 Stated differently, if the
sole purpose of preliminary relief were to preserve the status quo,
51. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
52. See Denlow, supra note 1, at 503-04; Weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1021.
53. See, e.g., James Powers, Note, A Status Quo Bias: Behavioral Economics and the
Federal Preliminary Injunction Standard, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (2014). The English
Court of Chancery first spoke of the role of preliminary injunctions in preserving the sta-
tus quo in the mid-1800s. Lee, supra note 3, at 127.
54. Black's Law Dictionary defines "status quo" as "[tihe situation that currently ex-
ists." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1633 (10th ed. 2014).
55. See, e.g., Black, supra note 25, at 1; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note
54, at 904 (defining "mandatory injunction" as "[a]n injunction that orders an affirmative
act or mandates a specified course of conduct").
56. See, e.g., Black, supra note 25, at 1; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note
54, at 905 (defining "prohibitory injunction" as "[a]n injunction that forbids or restrains an
act" and indicating that it is "the most common type of injunction").
57. See Wolf, Massachusetts Standards, supra note 15, at 5-6.
For example, if the [movants], who wish to protest peacefully without inter-
ference from hostile onlookers, are seeking a preliminary injunction to secure
police protection, they do not want to preserve the status quo: assaults by
hecklers while the police do nothing. They want the court to order the police




mandatory preliminary injunctions never would be granted,
which is not the case.
Despite the stated purpose, it is not clear what effect, if any,
the alleged preservation of the status quo actually has when de-
termining whether to award preliminary relief. There is little his-
torical basis for courts attaching any independent significance to
evaluation of the status quo,58 and there is scant evidence that
courts actually incorporate a separate status-quo analysis as part
of some bifurcated preliminary injunction evaluation.59 Addition-
ally, no cogent argument has been advanced for imposing a sepa-
rate analysis to determine whether the proposed preliminary in-
junctive relief in fact preserves the status quo.60 As pointed out in
one authoritative source, in practice the status quo discussion "is
used more as a way of describing decisions reached on other
grounds than as an independent rule."'" Some courts have said
that the preservation adage merely describes the overall abstract
goal of preliminary relief and has no effect on the actual evalua-
tion of the facts and circumstances of the dispute.2 Other courts
use this stated purpose as the basis for demanding some unde-
58. See Lee, supra note 3, at 125-26. As Professor Lee concluded:
[Tihe courts' discussion of the status quo finds its roots in the nineteenth cen-
tury courts of Chancery, but. . . the status quo was not given any independ-
ent doctrinal significance during this period. Similarly, Chancery courts in
the same era began to advert to a distinction between mandatory and prohib-
itory injunctions, but again they did not ascribe any controlling doctrinal sig-
nificance to the distinction .... [J]udicial adoption of a bifurcated prelimi-
nary injunction standard has only the shallowest of historical roots, and thus
cannot be justified on historical grounds.
Id.; see also id. at 161 (noting that "the 'status quo' historically was conceived as a ra-
tionale or explanation for the courts' exercise of preliminary equitable relief, not as a sub-
stantive standard with independent doctrinal significance"); cf. Leubsdorf, supra note 13,
at 530 ("At common law possession of realty was usually protected until a jury found a
greater right in another claimant. For a court of equity to disturb the status quo by inflict-
ing dispossession before trial would have been heretical 'meddling with freehold."').
59. See Black, supra note 25, at 23 (noting that a survey of U.S. Supreme Court cases
revealed that "the terms mandatory and prohibitory have not been used as an analytical
tool in reviewing whether an injunction should have been granted").
60. See LAYCOCK, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 11, at 448 ("[Courts] almost nev-
er explain how this standard relates to the [preliminary injunction] four-part test." (cita-
tions omitted)); see also Powers, supra note 53, at 1027 ("Such statements of purpose,
while notable, need not go beyond functioning as mere platitudes, throwaway lines in a
judicial opinion that do not figure in the substantive test applied by the court.").
61. 11A CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948.2, at 195 (2d ed. 2013).
62. See Powers, supra note 53, at 1036.
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fined higher burden of proof to acquire a mandatory, as opposed
to a prohibitory, preliminary injunction.3
Within the last twenty years, commentators and judges have
begun to understand the problems inherent in predicating prelim-
inary injunctive relief on preserving the status quo.64 First, the
definition of the status quo varies: some define it as the actual
current state of affairs,65 and some define it as the last act that
was not in violation of the law, sometimes referred to as the last
uncontested peaceable act.66 Second, assuming the status quo is
defined as the actual current condition, some movants actually
may not be seeking to preserve the status quo through prelimi-
nary relief; they may in fact be seeking a mandatory injunction."
Some courts and many modern commentators therefore view
preservation of the status quo as describing the effect-and not
the purpose--of a preliminary injunction, and have criticized the
imposition of a heightened requirement for mandatory injunc-
63. See id. at 1031-35. One commentator attributes application of the heightened psy-
chological effects on both litigants and judges. With respect to litigants, he identifies 'loss
aversion"-that, contrary to expected utility theory, preferences will be affected by what
someone possesses when making a decision-and the "endowment effect"-the tendency of
someone to over-value goods he or she owns. Id. at 1037-39. With respect to judges, he
identifies "status quo bias"--a reluctance to deviate from the status quo when given a
choice-and "omission bias"--the tendency to view acts that cause harm as worse than
omissions that are equally harmful. Id. at 1039-42. The commentator concludes that such
a heightened standard is not justified and should be abolished. Id. at 1050-51.
64. See, e.g., Black, supra note 25; Lee, supra note 3.
65. See, e.g., Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 622 F.3d 36, 40-41,
41 n.5 (1st Cir. 2010); see also WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 61, § 2948.2, at 124 (citing cas-
es).
66. See, e.g., Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2013) (defining the status
quo as the 'last uncontested status between the parties which preceded the controversy");
see also WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 61, § 2948, at 124-27 (citing cases); cf. LAYCOCK,
CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 11, at 448 ("Courts commonly say that preliminary in-
junctions are designed to preserve the status quo. Sometimes they elaborate that they
mean 'the last actual peaceable uncontested' status quo."). Some courts have dealt with
this definitional imprecision by "shift[ing] the focus to preserving the subject matter of the
lawsuit so that the court will be able to grant effective relief when the suit is resolved on
the merits." Wolf, Varying Standards, supra note 45, at 174 (emphasis added).
67. See Wolf, Massachusetts Standards, supra note 15, at 26 (pointing out that "[tihe
line is not always clear between the two forms of injunction" and that "[t]hrough the use of
the 'double negative' order, a court will sometimes enter an injunction that looks like a
prohibitory injunction but in fact is an affirmative (or mandatory) injunction").
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tions, claiming that the mandatory/prohibitory classification is a
distinction without a difference."s
The notion of a heightened standard for mandatory injunctions
apparently has a historical derivation in the hierarchical nature
of law and equity courts.s9 In the early nineteenth century, courts
of equity did not have authority to issue mandatory injunctions."
This was because, in large part, it was thought improper to order
someone to perform an affirmative act without having first had a
full examination of the merits of a cause of action." A prohibitory
injunction, on the other hand, does not order any action be tak-
en-but rather prohibits the non-movant from acting-and there-
fore was thought to be within the proper purview of equity.72 Eq-
uity courts soon responded by issuing negative decrees that,
although purporting to restrain a wrong, were framed to compel
the non-movant to perform affirmative acts, making any distinc-
tion between mandatory injunctions and prohibitory injunctions
illusory.73 As one commentator noted, "[a non-movant's] mandato-
68. See Weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1022-23 ("Many modern commentators view the
early use of the notion of preserving the status quo as merely describing the effect, not the
purpose, of a preliminary injunction and criticize the calcification of this notion into a
rule."); see also WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 61, § 2948.2, at 195-96 ("[W]ith a little ingenu-
ity practically any mandatory injunction may be phrased in prohibitory form."); Black, su-
pra note 25, at 9 (referring to the "traps inherent in the use of the terms-the possibility of
framing a mandatory decree in negative language, thus making it appear to be prohibito-
ry; the mandatory effect of every injunction, even a prohibitory one; and the changeable
nature from one to the other depending on the time that the [movant] gets to the court-
house"); Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 546 ("The distinction between requiring action and
prohibiting action is mainly a verbal one unrelated to the likelihood of irreparable loss to
the [non-movant]."); Powers, supra note 53, at 1028 (noting that the heightened standard
requirement has been "much criticized"); cf. Black, supra note 25, at 14 (contending that
"the distinction: if any actually remain[s], appear[s] to have been subsumed in a four-
pronged analysis"). Judge Posner in a Seventh Circuit opinion aptly summed up the criti-
cism of the distinction:
Preliminary relief is properly sought only to avert irreparable harm to the
moving party. Whether and in what sense the grant of relief would change or
preserve some previous state of affairs is neither here nor there. To worry
[about] these questions is merely to fuzz up the legal standard.
Chicago United Indus., Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 445 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations
omitted).
69. See generally Black, supra note 25, at 1-2; see also Lee, supra note 3, at 124-49
(discussing the historical standard).
70. See Black, supra note 25, at 6.
71. See id. at 8.
72. See id. at 1.
73. See id. at 6-7; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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ry conception of an order can almost always be rephrased by a
competent [movant's] attorney in prohibitory terms.74
Although many courts today continue to discuss the mandato-
ry/prohibitory injunction distinction,5 most commentators agree
that there is no justification for applying different standards
based on whether the status quo is affected.76 As one circuit court
of appeals opined:
It is often loosely stated that the purpose of a preliminary injunction
is to preserve the status quo .... It must not be thought, however,
that there is any particular magic in the phrase "status quo." The
purpose of a preliminary injunction is always to prevent irreparable
injury so as to preserve the court's ability to render a meaningful de-
cision on the merits. It often happens that this purpose is furthered
by preservation of the status quo, but not always. If the currently ex-
isting status quo itself is causing one of the parties irreparable inju-
ry, it is necessary to alter the situation so as to prevent the injury,
either by returning to the last uncontested status quo between the
parties by the issuance of a mandatory injunction or by allowing the
parties to take proposed action that the court finds will minimize the
irreparable injury. The focus always must be on prevention of injury
by a proper order, not merely on preservation of the status quo.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which in-
cludes Virginia, currently takes a more progressive approach.
Although it states that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is
"to protect the status quo and to prevent irreparable harm during
the pendency of a lawsuit ultimately to preserve the court's abil-
74. Lee, supra note 3, at 164.
75. See Black, supra note 25, at 2.
76. See id. (analyzing the historical treatment of mandatory versus prohibitory in-
junctions and concluding that "the terms mandatory and prohibitory, as part of the stand-
ard used in granting or denying a preliminary injunction, are not helpful analytical tools"
and, "[a]ccordingly, the vestiges of these terms should be stricken from legal language");
Lee, supra note 3, at 10 (concluding that "the heightened [status quo] standard is histori-
cally and theoretically unsound, and that the circuits that adopt a uniform standard have
the better approach"); see also id. at 166 ("The notion of a heightened standard of proof is
the misguided product of recent twentieth-century opinions; it finds no support in early
decisions in English Chancery or even in this country."); Powers, supra note 53, at 1028
("Disrupting the status quo may provide a benefit to one party, but only by depriving the
other party of some right he previously enjoyed.") (quoting 0 Centro Espirita Beneg-
ficiente Uniao de Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 1015-16 (10th Cir. 2004)).
77. Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted); see
also Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 546 ("Emphasis on preserving the status quo is a habit
without a reason."); id. at 540-41 (arguing that "the preliminary injunction standard




ity to render a meaningful judgment on the merits,"" it defines
the status quo as the "last uncontested status between the parties
which preceded the controversy."79 Existing case law nevertheless
is inconsistent and often unreasoned,"° and practitioners therefore
are understandably confused regarding what role, if any, status
quo may play in a preliminary injunction analysis.81
B. The Four-Part Test Applicable to Federal Preliminary
Injunctions
Although the concept of preliminary injunctive relief has exist-
ed since the birth of the nation, American courts "have not fol-
lowed consistent paths through the maze of [such] relief.""2 In ad-
dition to the Supreme Court ignoring its own prior rulings, the
federal courts of appeals often have overlooked precedent set by
78. Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 319 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Sun Microsystems, Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp. (In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig.), 333 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir.
2003), abrogated on other grounds by eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006)). Of note, the Fourth Circuit did not use the prohibitory vs. mandatory distinction
in Pashby to analyze the proposed preliminary injunctive relief but rather used it only to
determine what standard to apply to its abuse of discretion review of the district court's
action: an "exacting standard of review" (for prohibitory injunctions) or an "exacting
standard of review [that] is even more searching" (for mandatory injunctions). Id. (quoting
Sun Microsystems, Inc., 333 F.3d at 524).
79. Id. at 320 (quoting Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., Ltd., 675 F.3d 355, 378 (4th
Cir. 2012)).
80. According to Professor Lee:
[O]ne set of [U.S. Court of Appeals] circuits concludes that the "status quo" is
a critical factor in determining the appropriate preliminary injunction stand-
ard, while another holds that it is utterly irrelevant. Although the essence of
the conflict is relatively clear on the face of the courts' opinions, the analyti-
cal substance of the debate has been quite opaque. None of the circuits have
offered much in the way of a theoretical framework for addressing the ques-
tion. Both sides tend to cite their own prior holdings, snippets of dicta (such
as the general notion that the purpose of preliminary relief is to preserve the
status quo), and ipse dixit conclusions.
Lee, supra note 3, at 124. Even judges apparently are confused regarding the mandato-
ry/prohibitory distinction. See Black, supra note 25, at 20 (reporting that, based on a judi-
cial survey, "the comments of the judges indicate that the terms are not at all helpful; they
actually confuse the process").
81. See, e.g., Powers, supra note 53, at 1031 ("Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has not
resolved what role the status quo should play in preliminary injunction doctrine, prolong-
ing a fundamental disagreement among the federal circuit courts of appeals.").
82. Wolf, Massachusetts Standards, supra note 15, at 18; see also id. at 21-22 (claim-
ing that, during the twentieth century, "the Supreme Court continued its meandering
course through various tests and criteria" and that "over a period of fifteen years [between
1994 and 20091, the Court had numerous opportunities to clarify the standards for prelim-
inary relief, but it failed to do so").
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the Court as well, setting the stage for the creation of multiple in-
consistent "tests" for the issuance of preliminary injunctions.3
Consistent with the original intent of equity, the early applica-
tion of preliminary relief relied on the inherent discretion of the
chancellor.84 The concept of a chancellor looking to a preliminary
injunction "test" was anathema to equitable principles, as peti-
tioners appealed to the conscience of the court because the chan-
cellor was tasked with designing a remedy that was fair and just,
based on the unique circumstances of each individual case.85 In
the late nineteenth century, equity courts nevertheless began to
evaluate preliminary injunctions generally by balancing the equi-
ties and looking at the movant's likelihood of success.86 Irrepara-
ble injury thereafter was invoked as a ground for injunctive relief,
with some courts treating it as a threshold issue and other courts
including it as an additional element of a multi-part analysis.87
The "public interest" factor emerged later, in 1939, although sub-
sequent incorporation of this factor by courts in their preliminary
injunction calculus was inconsistent.88
Before long, many federal jurisdictions began to use a four-
factor test when determining whether to grant a petition for pre-
liminary injunction.89 Wording of the test varied slightly between
jurisdictions, but the four factors generally consisted of: (1) the
movant's likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the irreparable
harm to the movant in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the
balance of the equities between the movant and the non-movant;
and (4) the public interest.9 Another articulation of the test di-
83. See id. at 18 (noting that "the [Supreme] Court has not used its prior precedents
regularly in developing standards" and that "the lower federal courts, prior to Winter,
have barely given nodding recognition to the Supreme Court opinions regarding interlocu-
tory injunctions").
84. See, e.g., Weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1018 ("Chancery [during the nineteenth
century] could provide [preliminary injunction movants] with remedies not available in
the common law courts, which were limited to providing damages.").
85. See supra Part I.B.
86. See, e.g., Denlow, supra note 1, at 501-02.
87. See Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 533 ("[The invocation of an irreparable injury re-
quirement] reflected a more functional view of equity's proper role. Chancery's interven-
tion was to be based on the inadequacy of damage remedies, not on the Chancellor's con-
clusion that the substantive law was defective.").
88. See Wolf, Massachusetts Standards, supra note 15, at 21.
89. See Lea B. Vaughn, A Need for Clarity: Toward a New Standard for Preliminary




vides the "balance of the equities" prong into two factors-the
movant's irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief
and the non-movant's harm should preliminary relief be grant-
ed-and deletes the irreparable injury prong, as it is subsumed in
the "irreparable harm to the movant in the absence of prelimi-
nary relief' factor.9' The two multi-part tests actually are the
same because the "balance of the equities" factor typically is
evaluated by comparing the hardship of the movant without pre-
liminary relief to the hardship of the non-movant with prelimi-
nary relief, i.e., the harm to each side assuming it does not ac-
quire what it seeks.2 Additionally, because a court essentially is
comparing the situation with and without the requested prelimi-
nary injunction, the time period during which the factors-other
than likelihood-of-success-are evaluated is between the prelimi-
nary injunction hearing and the anticipated trial on the merits.3
1. The Split Amongst the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals
Although in modern times the federal courts of appeals have
largely agreed on the four factors to be considered when deter-
mining whether a preliminary injunction is warranted, they have
applied the factors inconsistently using one of three different ap-
proaches.4 One approach consists of a sequential inquiry, where
each factor is evaluated separately, and the movant must satisfy
each of the four factors for preliminary relief to be granted." A se-
cond approach is a balancing analysis, where the court looks at
the four factors together, and a lesser showing on one factor can
91. See, e.g., Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville, Inc. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d
189, 196 (4th Cir. 1977), overruled by The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), affld, The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); see also Vaughn, supra
note 89, at 869 ("[F]or many courts, the showing of irreparable injury is necessarily im-
plied in the balance of hardships.").
92. See WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 61, § 2948.2, at 170-72.
93. See id. § 2948, at 125-27.
94. See Denlow, supra note 1, at 497-98; see also Wolf, Massachusetts Standards, su-
pra note 15, at 26-27 ("Historically, the United States courts of appeals have differed
widely in their approaches to preliminary relief .... [Prior to 2008,] the federal appellate
courts had used at least nine different tests, excluding variations, for interlocutory re-
lief."); Weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1021 ("Although nearly all federal courts examine the-
se [four traditional] factors, the courts differ in the way they describe the factors and in
the weight they give each factor.").
95. See Weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1015.
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be cured by a particularly strong showing on one or more of the
other factors.9" The third approach requires an initial threshold
investigation of one or more of the factors and, depending on
whether the threshold is met, evaluating the remaining factors,
usually in a balancing methodology.7 The balancing and thresh-
old approaches often are referred to collectively as "sliding-scale"
analyses or standards because each approach typically allows for
strong consideration of some factors to compensate for relative
weakness in other factors.98 A sequential test necessarily is the
most stringent analysis because each of the four factors must be
satisfied;99 stated differently, the failure of the movant to satisfy
any of the four factors, to the required standard, will result in the
court denying the requested preliminary injunctive relief.1"0
A sliding-scale approach to evaluating preliminary injunctions
arguably is consistent with the traditional equitable discretion
granted to the chancellor.01 Judge Richard Posner, a long-time
judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, ironi-
cally distilled this equitable analysis quantitatively into a math-
ematical formula, building upon a concept introduced by Profes-
sor John Leubsdorf.°2 Judge Posner advocates that jurists
evaluating preliminary injunctions should grant injunctive relief
if: P x HP > (1 - P) x HD, where P is the movant's likelihood of suc-
cess at the trial on the merits (which also is the probability that
denying the preliminary injunction would be erroneous); H, is the
harm to the plaintiff/movant if the preliminary injunction is de-
nied; (1 - P) is the non-movant's likelihood of success at the trial
on the merits (which also is the probability that granting the pre-
liminary injunction would be erroneous); and H, is the harm to
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., id. References to "sliding-scale" approaches in this article therefore in-
clude both "balancing' and "threshold" analyses.
99. See Black, supra note 25, at 45; see also Vaughn, supra note 89, at 867 (pointing
out that "failure on any one part of the test results in a failure to meet the entire test").
100. See Vaughn, supra note 89, at 867.
101. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
102. See Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir.
1986). Judge Posner's formulation is a mathematical representation of how Professor
Leubsdorf described the preliminary injunction balancing analysis. See DOUGLAS
LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 118-23 (1991) [hereinafter
LAYCOCK, DEATH] (citing Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 540-41).
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the defendant/non-movant.3 Although the formula appears to
consider only the movant's likelihood of success and a balancing
of the equities, the irreparability of the movant's harm is as-
sumed in the formulation 4 and, as suggested by Judge Posner,
the harm to third parties, i.e., the effect on the public interest,
can be included in the probabilities.15 This quantitative analysis
is neat and compact, but it arguably is simplistic0 6 and, in any
case, the difficulty-or impossibility-of assigning numeric values
to the harms greatly reduces its practical value.10 7 It does, howev-
103. Am. Hosp., 780 F.2d at 593.
104. See Lee, supra note 3, at 151 (discussing Leubsdorfs "important distinction be-
tween injuries that can be redressed at final judgment and those that cannot"); see also
LAYCOCK, DEATH, supra note 102, at 120-21 ("The Leubsdorf-Posner formula implicitly
assumes that all harm can be characterized as either reparable or irreparable, and that
only irreparable harm counts.").
105. Am. Hosp., 780 F.2d at 594.
106. Even Judge Posner recognizes that his formulaic analysis is a bit facile. See id. at
593 (pointing out that his formula "is intended not to force analysis into a quantitative
straitjacket but to assist analysis by presenting succinctly the factors that the court must
consider in making its decision and by articulating the relationship among the factors").
Such attempts to convert abstract legal principles into mathematical formulations are not
new, and this one actually is a variant of the famous Learned Hand negligence calculus:
PL > B, where P is the probability of harm, L is the associated liability, and B is the bur-
den or cost to prevent the harm. See U.S. v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947). In the preliminary injunction equation, the burden would be what the non-movant
will suffer, i.e., the product of the non-movant's probability of success and harm suffered.
See Am. Hosp., 780 F.2d at 593 (referring to the Posner formulation as a "procedural coun-
terpart" to Judge Hand's negligence formula). The dissent in American Hospital harshly
criticizes use of the formula, claiming that "[p]roceedings in equity and cases sounding in
tort demand entirely different responses of a district judge" and that the precision re-
quired by the formula is "antithetical to the underlying principles of injunctive relief." Id.
at 609 (Swygert, J., dissenting). According to Professor Laycock, a more proper articula-
tion of the Leubsdorf-Posner formula-to properly account for actual complexities and to
demonstrate the formula's uselessness-is as follows:
Courts deciding whether to grant preliminary relief should try to minimize
the risk of legally unjustified irreparable harm, considering the probability
that the preliminary relief will be consistent with the ultimate rights of the
parties, and considering the likelihood, severity, and degree of irreparability
of the harm that [the movant] may suffer if preliminary relief is erroneously
denied and of the harm that [non-movant] may suffer if preliminary relief is
erroneously granted, recognizing that each of these variables extends over a
range of possibilities.
LAYCOCK, DEATH, supra note 102, at 122.
107. See Lee, supra note 3, at 152 n.260 ("[A]nalytically, quantification of the expected
irreparable harms is logically untenable. Because courts define.., irreparable harm as
harm that cannot be remedied by an award of money damages, any effort to place a dollar
value on such harms will necessarily fail."); see also LAYCOCK, DEATH, supra note 102, at
120 ("The problem is not just that the variables cannot be quantified in fact. The problem
is more fundamental: these variables cannot be conceptualized even in theory as having
discrete values that could be represented by points on a graph or by single numbers in an
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er, force the court to focus on the balancing process and the rela-
tionship among the various factors to be balanced."°8
As these analyses continued to mature, each federal circuit ap-
peared to develop a unique approach regarding the application of
the four-factor test, and some federal district courts announced
their own individual methodologies.0 9 The evolution of federal
preliminary injunction relief resulted in a "dizzying array of al-
ternative 'sliding scale' standards that had been adopted by vari-
ous federal circuits," in addition to the sequential analysis,"' with
more than nine separate approaches."' It also was clear that the
courts of appeals were inattentive to Supreme Court precedent,
perhaps because of the Supreme Court's own inconsistent ap-
proach to preliminary injunctions.1 2 Concern arose that these
varying standards could lead, or had led, to inconsistent judg-
ments, inequitable decisions, unnecessary litigation, and forum
shopping."' By the end of the twentieth century, the disagree-
ment among federal circuit courts was well documented, and
commentators universally agreed that "the coexistence of these
[various preliminary injunction] standards in the federal courts
has led to confusion.""' 4 These commentators also suggested that
equation."); cf. JOHN L. COSTELLO, VIRGINIA REMEDIES § 13.08[1] (4th ed. 2011 & Supp.
2014) ("There are many cases where harms and probabilities are not quantifiable, but the
trial judge must deal with them nonetheless.").
108. See LAYCOCK, DEATH, supra note 102, at 120.
109. See Wolf, Massachusetts Standards, supra note 15, at 17-18.
110. Jean C. Love, Teaching Preliminary Injunctions After Winter, 57 ST. LouiS U. L.J.
689, 692 (2013).
111. See Wolf, Massachusetts Standards, supra note 15, at 27.
112. See generally id. at 18-26 (discussing examples of Supreme Court decisions and
how those decisions lacked uniformity).
113. See Denlow, supra note 1, at 530-34. By "inequitable decisions," Judge Denlow
was referring primarily to the arguably absurd situation that might result from requiring
a higher burden of proof for a permanent injunction-a preponderance of the evidence
standard-than for a preliminary injunction subject to a sliding-scale test-potentially a
significantly lower standard. See id. at 532. "[P]arties with weak cases will be encouraged
to seek preliminary injunctive relief in cases where permanent relief may not be possible."
Id. Judge Denlow went on to opine that a lower, uncertain standard "encourages addition-
al litigation because neither the winning nor the losing side on the motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction is able to predict the likely outcome of the litigation on the merits,"
whereas a 50% likelihood standard would help the parties evaluate their positions. Id. He
further pointed out that attorneys are unable to counsel their client and predict the judi-
cial outcome when the legal principles that the court will employ are "unclear, ambiguous,
and rife with contradiction." Id. at 532-33.
114. See, e.g., Vaughn, supra note 89, at 840.
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"the time has come for a uniform standard and [for] the Supreme
Court [to] address this question.""'
2. The Fourth Circuit's Preliminary Injunction Test
As the federal circuit courts of appeals each developed a dis-
tinctive approach to evaluating the four preliminary injunction
equitable criteria, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit adopted one of the most complex threshold tests in Black-
welder Furniture Co. of Statesville, Inc. v. Seilig Manufacturing
Co."6 There, Blackwelder sought a preliminary injunction to re-
main a Seilig furniture distributor after its dealership had been
terminated."'
Like most other federal circuit preliminary injunction tests, the
Fourth Circuit's test incorporated the four familiar factors."8 Un-
der its analysis, however, if the balance-of-the-hardships factor
was strongly satisfied, a preliminary injunction could be issued
without evaluating all other factors."9 Specifically, the Court held
that "the first step in a Rule 65(a) [preliminary injunction] situa-
tion is for the court to balance the 'likelihood' of irreparable harm
to the [movant] against the 'likelihood' of harm to the [non-
movant] ., 112 "[I]f that balance is struck in favor of [the movant], it
is enough that grave or serious questions are presented; and [the
movant] need not show a likelihood of success."'' 1 The court indi-
cated that this preliminary relief analysis depends upon a "flexi-
115. Id. at 846 n.33; see also Denlow, supra note 1, at 533 ('The standard should define
the elements necessary for obtaining a preliminary injunction and provide guidance as to
how those standards should apply while providing trial courts with necessary discretion.").
One commentator went so far as to opine that "[w]hile non-uniformity of [preliminary in-
junction] decisions may serve a creative purpose in the short run, over time it tends to
breed disrespect for and discontent of the law and advance the perception that judicial de-
cisionmaking is largely arbitrary." Wolf, Varying Standards, supra note 45, at 236.
116. 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977). Notably, the Fourth Circuit refers to its test as a
"balance-of-hardship test," an apparent reference to the fact that it uses the balancing
prong-or prongs in the case of the Fourth Circuit-of the four-part test as a threshold
analysis. See id. at 194-96.
117. Id. at 192-93.
118. See id. at 195.
119. See id. The Fourth Circuit ostensibly was applying the preliminary injunction
standard as set forth in Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway. Id. at 193-94 (citing Conway, 279 U.S.
813).
120. Id. at 195.
121. Id. at 196.
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ble interplay" among the factors considered.1 2 The court in
Blackwelder held that the district court erred when it demanded
that the movant "must first show 'likelihood of success' in order to
be entitled to preliminary relief."'3
3. The Supreme Court's Guidance in Winter and Subsequent
Reaction by the United States Courts of Appeals
Against a backdrop where virtually every federal circuit court
of appeals evaluated preliminary injunctions differently,12 4 the
U.S. Supreme Court in 2008 reviewed a case from the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.125 In that case, Natural Resources Defense
Council ("NRDC") sought a preliminary injunction to stop the
U.S. Navy from conducting mid-frequency active sonar training
exercises in the waters off the coast of southern California
("SOCAL"), based on alleged injury to certain marine mammals.
1 26
At the time, the Ninth Circuit employed a sliding-scale test to de-
termine whether a preliminary injunction was warranted: "when
a [movant] demonstrates a strong likelihood of prevailing on the
merits, a preliminary injunction may be entered based only on a
'possibility' of irreparable harm."'127 Applying the facts of the case,
the lower court found that NRDC's high likelihood of success
combined with the possibility of injury to the SOCAL marine
mammals justified granting a preliminary injunction.'28 The Navy
argued on appeal that NRDC had not shown a likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits and that NRDC "must demonstrate a likeli-
hood of irreparable injury-not just a possibility-in order to ob-
tain preliminary relief."'2 9
Until Winter, the Supreme Court had not definitively articulat-
ed the necessary criteria to acquire a preliminary injunction,'30
122. Id.
123. Id. at 195.
124. See Wolf, Massachusetts Standards, supra note 15, at 27.
125. 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
126. Id. at 16-17.
127. Id. at 21.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added).
130. See Wolf, Massachusetts Standards, supra note 15, at 17 (pointing out that the
Supreme Court '%ad left the matter to the courts of appeals, which developed a variety of
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although it certainly had addressed evaluation of preliminary in-
junctions on numerous prior occasions.' According to the Court,
a [movant] seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that
he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer ir-
reparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the bal-
ance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the
public interest.
132
Of note, the cases to which the Court cited for support of its four-
factor test all speak in terms of "a likelihood" of irreparable injury
and success on the merits, so the Court's choice to use "is likely"
in its formulation appears deliberate.
133
The Court sided with the Navy regarding whether a "possibil-
ity" of irreparable injury was sufficient, stating that "[olur fre-
quently reiterated standard requires [movants] seeking prelimi-
nary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the
absence of an injunction."'' 34 The Court held that "[i]ssuing a pre-
liminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable
harm is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief
as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a
clear showing that the [movant] is entitled to such relief.'
35
The Supreme Court also discussed at length the public-interest
factor of the four-part test.36 Quoting one of its prior decisions,
the Court noted that "[i]n exercising their sound discretion, courts
of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences
standards").
131. See generally Wolf, Varying Standards, supra note 45, at 118.
132. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (emphasis added).
133. See id. Although none of the cases cited in Winter specifically mentioned "is like-
ly," the Court did use the "is likely" phraseology previously. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,
422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) ("The traditional standard for granting a preliminary injunction
requires the [movant] to show that in the absence of its issuance he will suffer irreparable
injury and also that he is likely to prevail on the merits. It is recognized, however, that a
district court must weigh carefully the interests on both sides." (emphasis added)). The
Court in Winter did, however, quote from a well-recognized federal practice and procedure
treatise that when seeking a preliminary injunction, an "applicant must demonstrate that
in the absence of a preliminary injunction, 'the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable
harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered."' Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (emphasis
added) (quoting WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 61, § 2948.1, at 139).
134. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. The Court's choice to italicize "likely" here is arguably sig-
nificant.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. See id. at 24-26.
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in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.""7 Based on
the facts of the case, the Court held that the public interests
"must be weighed against the possible harm to the ecological, sci-
entific, and recreational interests that are legitimately before this
Court."'188 The Court ultimately concluded that "[t]he public inter-
est in conducting training exercises under realistic conditions
plainly outweighs the interests advanced by the [movants] .
Without expressly so stating, the Court apparently was evaluat-
ing whether the public interest outweighed the possible harm to
the movant prior to the trial on the merits if the preliminary in-
junction were not granted.
Despite the Winter Court opining that all four prongs must be
established4 ' and that particular attention must be paid to the
public interests, the public-interest factor may have little or no
importance in preliminary injunction actions involving only pri-
vate interests.' For instance, in a bilateral monopoly, where only
the two parties have an interest in the outcome "-e.g., a private
property encroachment, specific performance of a sales contract-
there arguably is no "public interest," unless "enforcement of pri-
vate property rights," "enforcement of contracts," or some similar
generalized concern is characterized as a public interest.
143
137. Id. at 24 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)).
138. Id. at 25.
139. Id. at 26.
140. The Court articulated the four factors using the conjunctive "and," indicating that
all four factors must be satisfied. See id. at 20; see also infra note 162 and accompanying
text.
141. See 13 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.22[3] (Matthew
Bender 3d ed. 2015) ("Although the public interest will not be as important as the other
factors considered in the award of preliminary injunctive relief in actions involving only
private interests, it will be prominently considered in actions implicating government poli-
cy or regulation, or other matters of public concern.").
142. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 74 (4th ed. 1992).
143. In such cases after Winter, courts have focused more on a separate public-interest
evaluation, even if it is closely aligned with the likelihood-of-success evaluation of a gener-
alized interest. See, e.g., Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 330 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that
"the district court could find that the likelihood of success on the merits satisfied the pub-
lic interest prong... if other considerations did not meaningfully weigh on that factor");
Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("[A]lthough the
public interest inquiry is not necessarily or always bound to the likelihood of success o[n]
the merits, . . . absent any other relevant concerns ... the public is best served by enforc-
ing patents that are likely valid and infringed.") (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm.,
Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d
1109, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court's conclusion "that the public in-
terest in upholding free speech and association rights" satisfied the Winter pubic interest
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Winter's four-part test-although similar to preliminary in-
junction tests the courts of appeals had used previously-is
unique upon close examination.' Significantly, each of the pre-
Winter circuit court of appeals' preliminary injunction tests eval-
uated the "likelihood of success on the merits" and "likelihood of
irreparable injury.""14  Based on a plain reading, "likelihood"-
similar to "probability"-can be expressed as any percentage be-
tween 0% and 100%.146 In other words, there could be a very low
likelihood, e.g., a 5% likelihood, or a very high likelihood, e.g., a
90% likelihood. By contrast, to say something "is likely"-like
saying something "is probable"-implies that there is more evi-
dence for than against.'47 Arguably, this is especially true when
"likely" is used as an adverb, e.g., "success is likely," as opposed to
as an adjective, e.g., "a likely outcome." In other words, the Win-
ter formulation can be read to indicate that the movant must
prove that there is more than a 50% chance of success on the mer-
its and more than a 50% chance of irreparable injury in the ab-
sence of preliminary relief,148 in addition to satisfying the other
two prongs of the four-part test.
Unlike their reaction to prior Supreme Court preliminary in-
junction opinions, the federal courts of appeals appear intent on




144. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.
145. See generally Wolf, Massachusetts Standards, supra note 15 (discussing in detail
the pre- Winter preliminary injunction tests used by each circuit).
146. See POSNER, supra note 142, at 5 (discussing assignment of mathematical proba-
bilities by economists).
147. See Weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1053 (indicating that analysis of the "likely to
succeed" prong using a sliding-scale analysis is more difficult for judges to apply consist-
ently than a sequential test, "which naturally seems to parallel the preponderance of the
evidence standard used in civil litigation-that is, more likely than not or just over a fifty
percent chance").
148. See id. at 1052 (taking the position that "likely" means "more than fifty percent
likely"); see also Denlow, supra note 1, at 532-34 (arguing that a movant seeking a prelim-
inary injunction should be required to prove at least a 50% change of prevailing on the
merits). But see Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund
Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 37 & n.7 (2d Cir. 2010) (opining that "[a]lthough the [Supreme] Court
repeated the 'likely to succeed on the merits' phrasing, it did not suggest hat this factor
requires a showing that the movant is 'more likely than not' to succeed on the merits," and
claiming that Winter's requirement for better-than-negligible chances did not conflict with
the Second Circuit's serious-questions test because a serious-questions howing requires
more than better-than-negligible chances).
149. See generally Weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1012-17 (surveying the various inter-
pretations of Winter by the circuit courts of appeals).
20151
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The surviving question after Winter is whether the sliding-scale
analysis is still viable."' Perhaps unsurprisingly, the federal
courts of appeals are not in agreement regarding the answer.15
One view is that Winter made it clear that the four-part test is a
sequential test, the factors need to be evaluated separately, and
"is likely" perhaps indicates that more than a 50% probability is
required.5 2 The other view is that "is likely" simply indicates
something more than a mere possibility, the sliding-scale analysis
remains valid, and a movant is not required to demonstrate more
than a 50% chance of success both on the merits and of irrepara-
ble harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.' Although
Winter addressed only the "movant is likely to suffer irreparable
harm" prong, the Court's interpretation of "is likely" in that con-
text clearly should adhere to the "movant is likely to succeed on
the merits" factor as well, as the wording of the two phrases is
identical.'
The tension between the post-Winter sequential and sliding-
scale approaches perhaps played out most vividly in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where inconsistent intra-
circuit opinions arose.' Winter was a clear edict that the Ninth
Circuit's prior sliding-scale test was unacceptable;6 the likeli-
hood of success on the merits, no matter how strong, could not
make up for the fact that there was a mere "possibility" of irrepa-
rable injury in the absence of preliminary relief.' The Ninth Cir-
150. See id. at 1016 (noting that there currently is a split in federal circuit courts re-
garding whether sliding-scale preliminary injunction tests have been foreclosed).
151. See id.; see also Bethany M. Bates, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for
Preliminary Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522, 1556 (2011) ("Winter
provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the appropriate application [of
the four-part test], but the Court's lack of clarity led to more confusion among the cir-
cuits.").
152. See Weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1033-34, 1042-46, 1052.
153. See id. at 1035-42.
154. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). According to the
well-accepted rule of legal text interpretation, identical words used in a document are pre-
sumed to have the same meaning. See Ratzlaf v. U.S., 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994) ("A term
appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it
appears."). This presumption is "at its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a
given sentence." Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994).
155. See Weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1040-46.
156. See, e.g., Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.
2011) (pointing out that "Winter explicitly rejected [the Ninth Circuit's prior] approach").
157. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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cuit's decisions after Winter therefore necessitated a re-
formulation of the circuit's four-factor preliminary injunction test.
a. The Post-Winter Sequential Preliminary Injunction Test
In DISH Network Corp. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, DISH sought to preliminarily enjoin, on First Amendment
grounds, a section of the Satellite Television Extension and Local-
ism Act of 2010 that determined when satellite providers would
be required to carry certain educational stations in high defini-
tion. ' The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of a
preliminary injunction, which was based on the movant's failure
to demonstrate that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its
claim.'59 The circuit court held that for DISH to prevail in its re-
quest for preliminary injunctive relief, it had to "demonstrate
that it meets all four of the elements of the preliminary injunc-
tion test established in Winter."'6 DISH's failure to demonstrate
one of the factors, i.e., likely success on the merits, therefore was
sufficient to defeat its request for preliminary relief. ' This inter-
pretation of Winter-that a sequential test is required-certainly
is reasonable.
A plain reading of the four-part test articulated in Winter-
phrasing the factors in the conjunctive-arguably requires that
the movant independently prove each factor, indicating a sequen-
tial analysis."2 The Supreme Court's approach in Winter also
158. 653 F.3d 771, 775, amending and superseding, on denial of reh'g en banc, DISH
Network Corp. v. FCC, 636 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2011).
159. Id. at 782.
160. Id. at 776.
161. Id. at 776-77. According to the court:
Therefore, even if we were to determine that DISH is likely to succeed on the
merits, we would still need to consider whether it satisfied the remaining el-
ements of the preliminary injunction test. However, because we agree with
the district court that DISH has failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating
it has met the first element, we need not consider the remaining three.
Id.
162. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 116-19 (2012) (discussing conjunctive lists). Commentators have specifically
opined that the Winter test consists of a conjunctive list. See, e.g., LAYCOCK, CASES AND
MATERIALS, supra note 11, at 444 ("Read literally, the Court's initial formulation treats
these criteria as four separate requirements that [movant] 'must establish."'); Weisshaar,
supra note 12, at 1049-50 (arguing that the plain language of Winter denotes a sequential
test). The plain reading of Winter as requiring a sequential test-and the denouncement of
the sliding-scale approach-is corroborated by commentary released soon after Winter was
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demonstrates that it evaluated the four factors sequentially. Alt-
hough the Navy's appeal challenged the Ninth Circuit's evalua-
tion of the likelihood-of-success and irreparable-injury prongs, the
Supreme Court found that NRDC, as the movant, failed to satisfy
the public interest factor, making evaluation of the two chal-
lenged prongs unnecessary.'63 The Court stated:
[Elven if [the movants] have shown irreparable injury from the Na-
vy's training exercises, any such injury is outweighed by the public
interest and the Navy's interest in effective, realistic training of its
sailors. A proper consideration of these factors alone requires denial
of the requested injunctive relief. For the same reason, we do not ad-
dress the lower courts' holding that [the movants] have also estab-
lished a likelihood of success on the merits.
164
Stated differently, failure to satisfy one prong rendered evalua-
tion of the other three prongs unnecessary because a movant
must satisfy all four factors.'65
A subsequent Supreme Court opinion also supports that the
preliminary injunction test is a sequential analysis. In Nken v.
Holder, a Supreme Court opinion released five months after Win-
ter, an alien sought a stay of removal pending review of the re-
moval order.166 Analogizing the four-factor test for stays pending
appeal with the preliminary injunction four-factor test, the major-
ity reiterated that more than a possibility of irreparable injury
and more than a possibility of likelihood of success are required to
satisfy the four-factor test.17 Justice Kennedy, in a concurring
decided. See, e.g., Bradfute W. Davenport, Jr. & Joshua D. Heslinga, Bye, Bye, Blackweld-
er? Recent Cases and the Standards for Preliminary Injunctions in Virginia's Federal and
State Courts, 14 LIT. NEWS J. 1, 6 (2009) ("[P]reliminary injunctions will be tougher to ob-
tain because litigants may no longer use 'sliding scales' to downplay one factor because of
a strong position on another factor."); Fourth Circuit Adopts New Injunction Standard
(Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2009/8/Fourth-Cir
cuit-Adopts-New-Injunction-Standard.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). Some later commen-
tary concurs with this interpretation. See, e.g., Weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1049 ('The
most natural reading of Winter is that it requires a sequential test .... Winter's articula-
tion of the traditional preliminary injunction test contains four factors, joined by semico-
lons and the conjunction 'and.' Typically, this sort of formulation indicates a list where all
of the elements are required.").
163. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23-24 (2008).
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. See Weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1028 ('The fact that the movants' failure to pre-
vail on the public-interest factor was sufficient, by itself, to doom their quest for a prelimi-
nary injunction suggests that the Winter court was performing a sequential test.").
166. 556 U.S. 418, 423 (2009).
167. Id. at 434-35. Although the Court in Nken was analyzing a stay pending appeal
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opinion, apparently wanted to make it clear that the familiar test
was to be applied sequentially: "When considering success on the
merits and irreparable harm, courts cannot dispense with the re-
quired showing of one simply because there is strong likelihood of
the other."6 '
As discussed previously, a plain reading of "likely" indicates
there is more evidence for than against or, in other words, there
is greater than a 50% chance.6' This interpretation is supported
by Black's Law Dictionary, which defines "likely" as "apparently
true or real; probable."7 ' Although the definition of "probable" in
the current version of Black's Law Dictionary is unhelpful-as it
defines "probable" as "likely to exist, be true, or happen,"'7' a cir-
cular argument-a previous edition of Black's defined "probable"
as, inter alia, "having more evidence for than against,"'72 i.e.,
more than a 50% chance. As also discussed previously, "is likely"
should be equated with more than a 50% probability for both the
irreparable-injury and success-on-the-merits prongs of the four-
factor test.'73 Under the rules of legal text construction, terms ap-
pearing in the same statute, or in the same contract paragraph,
or within a multi-part test, are generally understood to have the
same meaning."'
Interpreting "is likely" as requiring more than a 50% probabil-
ity also is consistent with characterizing a preliminary injunction
and not a preliminary injunction, it pointed out:
There is substantial overlap between [the factors governing a stay pending
appeal] and the factors governing preliminary injunctions; not because the
two are one and the same, but because similar concerns arise whenever a
court order may allow or disallow anticipated action before the legality of
that action has been conclusively determined.
Id. at 434 (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 24).
168. Id. at 438 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
169. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
170. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 54, at 1069.
171. Id. at 1395.
172. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (6th ed. 1990). In this 1990 edition of Black's,
"likely" is defined simply as "probable," making reference to the definition of "probable"
logical. Id. at 925 (citing to People v. Randall, 711 P.2d 689, 692 (Colo. 1985), for the prop-
osition that "l]ikely is word [sic] of general usage and common understanding, broadly
defined as of such nature or so circumstantial as to make something probable and having
better chance of existing or occurring than not") (emphasis added)).
173. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
174. See id.
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as an "extraordinary remedy."'175 Because preliminary relief nec-
essarily bypasses due process, a movant at the preliminary relief
phase arguably should be required to satisfy at least the same
standard of proof as at the permanent relief phase.176 The stand-
ard for issuing a permanent injunction at the trial on the mer-
its-after full due process-is a preponderance of the evidence,
i.e., greater than 50%.177 A movant therefore should be required to
satisfy at least this same standard in order to be granted extraor-
dinary relief.178 Otherwise, a party with a known weak case could
seek preliminary relief understanding that it will not prevail at
the trial on the merits, thereby increasing expenses and wasting
judicial resources.171
175. See Weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1053 ("A court should not be able to alter the rel-
ative positions of the parties, sometimes dramatically, without the movant first establish-
ing that he is at least likely to prevail on the merits. The [sliding-scale] test is therefore in
tension with the traditional characterization of preliminary injunctions as rare, extraordi-
nary remedies."); see also Black, supra note 25, at 26 ("Under [the sequential approach],
preliminary injunctions are considered extraordinary and drastic remedies that should not
be granted lightly."); Crawford, supra note 44, at 441 (pointing out the Anti-Federalists'
concern that allowing federal courts equity jurisdiction would allow chancellors "to decide
as their conscience, their opinions, their caprice, or their politics might dictate" and Alex.
ander Hamilton's response that "the great and primary use of a court of equity [will be] to
give relief in extraordinary cases" (quoting Fed. Farmer No. 15, Jan. 18, 1788, in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 322-23 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)); THE FEDERALIST No.
83, at 569 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
176. See Denlow, supra note 1, at 532 ("It is difficult to understand why a party who is
seeking the 'very serious remedy' of an injunction should be held to a significantly lower
standard on the merits than the party would have to establish at a trial on the merits ....
A party should be required to make out at least a 50% chance of winning before a prelimi-
nary injunction is granted."); see also Crawford, supra note 44, at 438 ('The requirements
that must be met in order to enjoin another party from commencing a specific action serve
as a vital protection against the potential error of issuing such an order prior to all the
facts being established."). The rationale of the burden of proof being consistent with an
extraordinary remedy later was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Winter, although
the Court admittedly was referring to whether the movant was likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief and not whether the movant was likely to suc-
ceed on the merits. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) ("Issuing a
preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with
our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be
awarded upon a clear showing that the [movant] is entitled to such relief.").
177. See supra note 113.
178. See Denlow, supra note 1, at 532 ("If a party must show at least a 50% chance of
prevailing, then the decision on the preliminary injunction helps the parties evaluate their
positions. Requiring a higher standard is particularly important in those cases in which
full-blown evidentiary hearings are conducted because the proofs are generally substan-
tially similar between a full-blown preliminary injunction and a trial on the merits.").
179. See id. at 538.
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A sequential evaluation of the four factors makes a sliding-
scale analysis inappropriate and, if "is likely" is interpreted as
more than a 50% probability, a sliding-scale analysis-as well as
the Leubsdorf/Posner formula-is unnecessary.'s° A very narrow
reading of Winter, however, limits its holding to concluding that a
mere "possibility of irreparable harm" is insufficient to satisfy the
federal preliminary injunction four-part test, as a "possibility" is
insufficient to make irreparable injury "likely," however 'likely" is
defined."' Such a narrow holding implies that more than a possi-
bility, but perhaps less than a 50% probability, might be suffi-
cient to find a factor to be "likely" and leaves room for the contin-
ued existence of a sliding-scale evaluation.8 '
b. The Post-Winter Sliding-Scale Preliminary Injunction Test
Another Ninth Circuit opinion, Alliance for the Wild Rockies v.
Cottrell, interpreted Winter as allowing a sliding-scale prelimi-
nary injunction analysis.'83 Alliance sought a preliminary injunc-
tion to stop a timber salvage sale proposed by the U.S. Forest
Service, and the district court denied the preliminary relief, hold-
ing that Alliance failed to demonstrate the requisite likely irrepa-
rable injury and success on the merits.'84 The Ninth Circuit re-
versed the district court's ruling because the lower court failed to
apply the "serious-questions" test, and ordered that the district
court issue a preliminary injunction.'8s The circuit court held:
'Serious questions going to the merits' and a balance of hard-
ships that tips sharply towards the [movant] can support issu-
ance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the [movant] also
180. If there were both more than a 50% chance of success on the merits and more than
a 50% chance of irreparable harm, there would be no need to use a sliding-scale analysis;
the sliding scale is only necessary when one of the factors is weak, which almost certainly
is not the case if that factor is more likely than not to be true. Similarly, because the
Leubsdorf-Posner formula implies a sliding-scale approach necessitated when one of the
probabilities is less than 50%, a sequential analysis makes the formula irrelevant.
181. See, e.g., Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co.,
582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009) (equating Winter's "likely to succeed on the merits" factor
with "a plausible claim on the merits"); see also Love, supra note 110, at 708-12 (discuss-
ing the "serious questions" approach adopted by the Second, Seventh, and some Ninth Cir-
cuit courts post-Winter).
182. See weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1035-42.
183. 632 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011).
184. Id. at 1128-29.
185. Id. at 1135.
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shows a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is
in the public interest."' Although the Alliance court acknowl-
edged Winter's requirement to satisfy all four factors, making the
test somewhat stricter than the Ninth Circuit's pre-Winter test,
187
the court was willing to equate "serious questions" with "likely to
succeed on the merits" as long as the balance of equities tips
sharply toward the movant.'8 The court also noted that the Win-
ter Court did not expressly reject a sliding-scale approach.9
Courts finding that Winter does not preclude a sliding-scale
analysis, including the Alliance court,'9° rely in part on Justice
Ginsburg's dissent in Winter, where she interpreted the majori-
ty's silence on the "sliding-scale" issue as not precluding the con-
tinued use of the approach:
Flexibility is a hallmark of equity jurisdiction. "The essence of equity
jurisdiction has been the power of the chancellor to do equity and to
mould [sic] each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flex-
ibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it." Consistent with eq-
uity's character, courts do not insist that litigants uniformly show a
particular, predetermined quantum of probable success or injury be-
fore awarding equitable relief. Instead, courts have evaluated claims
for equitable relief on a "sliding scale," sometimes awarding relief
based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood of success is
very high. This Court has never rejected that formulation, and I do
not believe it does so today.T9
186. Id.
187. Prior to Winter, the Ninth Circuit could issue a preliminary injunction if there
were serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tipped sharply
towards the movant; in such a situation, review of the other two factors was not required.
See, e.g., id. at 1131 (describing the "serious questions" approach as "one alternative on a
continuum" of pre-Winter preliminary injunction tests).
188. See id. Other federal courts of appeals adhering to a sliding-scale analysis post-
Winter are the First Circuit (Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 622 F.3d
36, 42-43 (1st Cir. 2010)), Second Circuit (Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc. v. VCG Special Op-
portunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 2010)), and Seventh Circuit
(Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 795 (7th Cir. 2013)). As one
commentator noted, prior to Winter many of the other circuits "were already considering
the four traditional factors and applied a sliding scale test inconsistently, if at all, and
thus were not directly affected by Winter." Bates, supra note 151, at 1538.
189. Alliance, 632 F.3d at 1131 ('The majority opinion in Winter did not, however, ex-
plicitly discuss the continuing validity of the 'sliding scale' approach to preliminary injunc-
tions employed by this circuit and others.").
190. See, e.g., id. at 1132.
191. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 51 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added) (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)).
[Vol. 50:273
VIRGINIA TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS
Flexibility under a sliding-scale approach could, for instance,
account for the inability to adequately develop the merits at a
truncated preliminary relief hearing in order to predict likelihood
of success'92 or allow for preliminary relief to prevent undeniable
irreparable injury despite a weak likelihood of success on the
merits. 193
Later in her dissent, Justice Ginsburg used "likely" several
times in a fashion that arguably was intended to downplay its
significance and dilute the common definition of the adverb "like-
ly," which when employed in such a grammatical fashion-e.g., to
say something "is likely"-indicates greater than a 50% chance.'94
Specifically, she used 'likely" in a manner that implied a smaller
probability of occurrence: twice as an adjective ("this likely harm"
and "the likely, substantial harm to the environment") and once
modified by "sufficiently" ("[i]f such injury is sufficiently like-
ly").' 95 Some commentators found that Chief Justice Roberts's
failure to respond to Justice Ginsburg's statement, on behalf of
the majority, just as significant.'96 In fact, however, the majority
192. See Vaughn, supra note 89, at 875.
193. See id. at 866 ("Because the factors [in a sequential test] cannot be traded off
against each other, even a crushing and certain specter of harm will not overcome a weak
showing on the merits.").
194. Winter, 555 U.S. at 53-54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
195. Id. Admittedly, when 'likely" is used as an adjective, it plainly means more than a
50% probability-just as "is likely" does-although its impact as an adjective perhaps is
not as precise as when it is used as an adverb. It also is unclear what "sufficiently likely"
connotes, although it arguably is intended to decrease the minimum quantum required-
to something less than 50%--from that when 'likely" is used alone or as an adverb.
196. See Love, supra note 110, at 707-08.
[lit is highly significant that Chief Justice Roberts chose not to respond to
Justice Ginsburg's observation regarding the viability of the "sliding scale"
test, especially since he devoted a lengthy footnote to setting forth his re-
sponses to both the concurring and dissenting opinions in Winter .... [Tihe
Supreme Court might be willing to approve a 'sliding scale' test which re-
quires proof that the [movant] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the ab-
sence of preliminary injunctive relief, but which does not require proof that
the [movant] is likely to succeed on the merits.
Id.; see also Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.,
598 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 2010) ("If the Supreme Court had meant for [Winter, Nken, or its
other post- Winter preliminary injunction case] to abrogate the more flexible standard for a
preliminary injunction, one would expect some reference to the considerable history of the
flexible standards applied in this circuit, seven of our sister circuits, and in the Supreme
Court itself .... We have found no command from the Supreme Court that would foreclose
the application of our established 'serious questions' standard as a means of assessing a
movant's likelihood of success on the merits .... "). Such a reading, however, ignores a
plain reading of Winter's 'likely to succeed" prong.
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dismisses Justice Ginsburg's dissent summarily, as the bulk of
the dissent "is devoted to the merits," and the majority points out
that "we do not address the underlying merits of [the movant's]
claims.197 Further, just because the majority chooses not to com-
ment on a remark made in a dissent does not indicate that the
majority somehow adopts the remark through omission; it is basic
hornbook law that a dissenting opinion has no precedential value,
and the majority's choice not to respond to a comment in a dis-
senting opinion is even further removed.9 Significantly, federal
courts of appeals that believe that the sliding-scale analysis sur-
vives Winter often offer a post-Winter articulation of the four-part
test that uses the word "likelihood" instead of "likely," ignoring
the express Winter formulation or, alternatively, arguably des-
perate to buttress the shaky foundation of the sliding-scale analy-
sis.
99
Courts advocating a post-Winter sliding-scale test also some-
times interpret language in the Winter majority opinion as sup-
portive of a balancing approach.2"' In Winter, the Supreme Court
stated: "In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity
should pay particular regard for the public consequences in em-
ploying the extraordinary remedy of injunction."2" As one court
opined regarding this language, "the Court implied that balanc-
197. Winter, 555 U.S. at 31, 31 n.5. Professor Laycock questions whether, in light of the
majority's finding that the movant failed to satisfy the public-interest factor, "all the rest
[is] dictum." LAYCOCK, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 11, at 444.
198. Michael L. Eber, When the Dissent Creates the Law: Cross-Cutting Majorities and
the Prediction Model of Precedent, 58 EMORY L.J. 208, 209 (2008) (commenting that "[i]f a
dissent created the law, it would not be styled as a dissent" and that "dissents have no le-
gally binding force and are necessarily dicta").
199. See, e.g., Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 622 F.3d 36, 42-43
(1st Cir. 2010); Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund
Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738
F.3d 786, 795 (7th Cir. 2013). Of note, most post-Winter cases in these circuits state the
Winter test verbatim-with the "is likely" language-but hen revert to using 'likelihood of
success" and/or "likelihood of irreparable injury" during their actual analyses. It arguably
is understandable that a circuit court-laden with significant history using a given four-
part test-would attempt to reconcile Winter with the preliminary injunction test it had
used previously. As one commentator responded to the Second Circuit's post-Winter re-
fusal to abandon its sliding-scale test, "the Second Circuit sidestepped Supreme Court
precedent in an effort to sustain five decades of its own jurisprudence." Crawford, supra
note 44, at 467.
200. See, e.g., Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.
2011).
201. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added) (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)).
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ing is appropriate when it indicated that 'particular regard'
should be paid to 'the public consequences in employing the ex-
traordinary remedy of injunction.""'2 2 Some courts have gone so
far as to claim that elimination of the sliding-scale test would de-
prive them of their "longstanding discretion" to issue preliminary
injunctions, which they believe the Supreme Court did not in-
tend .
c. The Fourth Circuit's Post-Winter Preliminary Injunction Test
As discussed previously, the Fourth Circuit prior to Winter
analyzed preliminary injunction petitions using the Blackwelder
test, a threshold analysis where satisfaction of only two of the
four factors could support preliminary injunctive relief."4 The
Blackwelder analysis is similar to the "serious questions" sliding-
scale approach used by the Ninth Circuit prior to Winter. After
Winter, the Fourth Circuit therefore had the same options as the
Ninth Circuit when analyzing preliminary injunctions: modify its
existing sliding-scale test to incorporate Winter's undisputed re-
quirement to analyze all four factors or abandon the sliding-scale
analysis altogether.
The first post-Winter preliminary injunction case presented to
the Fourth Circuit was The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed-
eral Election Commission, which was decided in 2009.20' There,
Real Truth challenged the constitutionality of certain Federal
Election Commission regulations and sought a preliminary in-
junction prohibiting the agency from enforcing the challenged
regulatory provisions against Real Truth and others similarly
situated; this would allow Real Truth to engage in activities that
202. Alliance, 632 F.3d at 1132 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 24). This interpretation by
the Ninth Circuit is arguably strained.
203. See, e.g., Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 35 (indicating that the Second Circuit had been
applying its sliding-scale test for "the last five decades"); Save Strawberry Canyon v. Dep't
of Energy, No. C 08-03494 WHA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38180, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22,
2009) ("It would be most unfortunate if the Supreme Court... had eliminated the
longstanding discretion of a district judge to preserve the status quo with provisional relief
until the merits could be sorted out in cases where clear irreparable injury would other-
wise result and at least 'serious questions' going to the merits are raised ....
204. See supra note 116-23 and accompanying text.
205. 575 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), affd, The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
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otherwise might be in violation of the regulations without fear of
penalties."6 After the district court denied the requested prelimi-
nary relief, Real Truth appealed.2 7
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of Winter was in stark con-
trast to other federal courts of appeals that had weighed in, re-
sulting in a clear repudiation of Blackwelder.°5 Noting that a pre-
liminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the court-
invoking terminology from Winter-then stated: "Because a pre-
liminary injunction affords, on a temporary basis, the relief that
can be granted permanently after trial, the party seeking the pre-
liminary injunction must demonstrate by 'a clear showing' that,
among other things, it is likely to succeed on the merits at tri-
al."2° The court then declared that "the Supreme Court articulat-
ed clearly what must be shown to obtain a preliminary injunc-
tion" and pointed out that "all four requirements must be
satisfied."'21 The court went on to state:
Indeed, the Court in Winter rejected a standard that allowed the
[movant] to demonstrate only a "possibility" of irreparable harm be-
cause that standard was "inconsistent with our characterization of
injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be
awarded upon a clear showing that the [movant] is entitled to such
relief.
211
The Fourth Circuit then identified four substantive reasons
why the Blackwelder standard "stands in fatal tension" with Win-
21ter. 12 First, "[t]he Winter requirement that the [movant] clearly
demonstrate that it will likely succeed on the merits is far stricter
than the Blackwelder requirement that the [movant] demonstrate
only a grave or serious question for litigation," '213 although the
Fourth Circuit did not define "likely" in terms of a definitive per-
centage. Second, Winter requires that the movant make a clear
showing of irreparable harm absent preliminary relief, whereas
206. Id. at 345.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 344-45 ("Because of its differences with the Winter test, the Blackweld-
er... test may no longer be applied in granting or denying preliminary injunctions in the
Fourth Circuit, as the standard articulated in Winter governs the issuance of preliminary
injunctions not only in the Fourth Circuit but in all federal courts.").
209. Id. at 345 (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)).
210. Id. at 346.
211. Id. (emphasis added).




Blackwelder merely required that the movant's irreparable harm
outweigh that of the non-movant and allowed only a possibility of
irreparable harm upon a strong showing of probability of suc-
cess.214 Third, Winter makes it clear that courts should pay par-
ticular attention to public consequences, whereas Blackwelder
does not always require consideration of the public interest.2 1
And fourth, Winter "articulates four requirements, each of which
must be satisfied as articulated," as opposed to the "flexible in-
terplay" between all of the factors allowed by Blackwelder, "for all
four [factors] are intertwined and each affects in degree all the
others."'216 The court then reiterated in a subsequent decision the
idea that "Winter articulates four requirements, each of which
must be satisfied as articulated.217
The Fourth Circuit thereby rejected its prior sliding-scale test
and indisputably interpreted Winter as requiring a sequential
analysis. The court summarized its holding: "Because of its dif-
ferences with the Winter test, the Blackwelder ... test may no
longer be applied in granting or denying preliminary injunctions
in the Fourth Circuit, as the standard articulated in Winter gov-
erns the issuance of preliminary injunctions not only in the
Fourth Circuit but in all federal courts.21 8 In short, whereas the
vast majority of other federal circuit post-Winter decisions
staunchly maintained a foothold on some form of sliding-scale
analysis, the Fourth Circuit jettisoned the Blackwelder sliding-
scale analysis and adopted a sequential test consistent with a
plain reading of Winter.1 9
Overall, the arguments supporting adoption of a sequential
preliminary injunction analysis-including a plain reading of
Winter, subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions implying a se-
quential approach, and a preliminary injunction being an "ex-
traordinary" remedy-appear to outweigh those advocating a slid-
ing-scale approach such as the one in Justice Ginsburg's dissent
214. Id. at 347.
215. Id.
216. Id. (alteration in original).
217. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated: "[C]ourts considering whether to impose prelimi-
nary injunctions must separately consider each Winter factor." Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d
307, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
218. Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 347.
219. See generally Weisshaar, supra note 12, at 1016.
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and the "traditional" role of flexibility in equity. In addition to ar-
guably being the most faithful interpretation of Winter, the
Fourth Circuit's opinion in Real Truth most likely is the one that
would be followed by Virginia courts looking to apply federal
law.22°
III. THE EVOLUTION OF VIRGINIA TEMPORARY INJUNCTION LAW
Unlike federal preliminary injunctive relief, which has both
preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders, pre-
liminary injunctive relief in Virginia is in the form of "temporary
injunctions."'221 Although temporary injunctions also encompass ex
parte emergency injunctive proceedings, which are analogous to
federal temporary restraining orders,222 this article focuses only
on the equivalent of federal preliminary injunctions, i.e., injunc-
tions issued after notice to the defendant and prior to the trial on
the merits. Virginia commentators sometimes refer to Virginia
temporary injunctions as "preliminary injunctions," "interlocutory
injunctions," or "ancillary injunctions,""22 but there are no such
designations in the Virginia Code.224
As with federal preliminary injunction law, statutory guidance
regarding Virginia temporary injunction law is vague and
broad.2  Although temporary injunctions are discussed in the
220. Because the Fourth Circuit has jurisdiction over Virginia, hears appeals from Vir-
ginia federal district courts, and commonly interprets Virginia law, Virginia state courts
relying on federal law normally look to Fourth Circuit law (or law from Virginia's federal
district courts, which are bound to follow Fourth Circuit law).
221. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-620 to -634 (Repl. Vol. 2015). In addition to temporary
injunctions, Virginia courts also can issue shorter term restraining orders "in cases of
great emergency." 10A MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE OF VIRGINIA & WEST VIRGINIA,
INJUNCTIONS § 2 (Repl. Vol. 2011) [hereinafter MICHIE'S]; cf. KENT SINCLAIR & LEIGH B.
MIDDLEDITCH, JR., VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 252 (5th ed. 2008) ("The temporary injunc-
tion is distinguished from a restraining order, in that a restraining order stays the pro-
ceeding for a briefer period and often is granted while a temporary injunction is being
sought.").
222. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-629 (Repl. Vol. 2015) (granting the
chancellor discretion to issue an injunction without notice to the non-movant).
223. See, e.g., W. HAMILTON BRYSON, BRYSON ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.05
(4th ed. 2005 & Supp. 2012); VIRGINIA CIVIL BENCHBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS §
8.06[3] (2014-15 ed. Matthew Bender) [hereinafter VIRGINIA CIVIL BENCHBOOK] (referring
to 'Temporary/preliminary injunction").
224. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-620 to -634 (Repl. Vol. 2015); see also COSTELLO, supra
note 107, § 13.08 ("[Olne may hear the federal phrase 'preliminary injunction' in some dis-
course; today, its reference in Virginia can only be to the statutory temporary injunction.").
225. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-620 to -634 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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Virginia Code, the statutory requirements largely reaffirm the
"traditional equitable remedy of long standing.' 26 The most sub-
stantive code section states: "No temporary injunction shall be
awarded unless the court shall be satisfied of the [movant's] equi-
ty. '2 The Virginia chancellor's equitable discretion extends to de-
ciding whether notice to the non-movant is required before pro-
ceeding and the duration of the temporary injunction.22 s Similar
to federal law,229 the Virginia Code requires that the movant post
an injunction bond "to pay the costs and damages sustained by
any party found to have been incorrectly enjoined.22 A few specif-
ic temporary injunction scenarios are addressed by statute,2 1 alt-
hough such situations arguably also could be addressed by tradi-
tional equity practice absent statutory authority.2 2
A. Equitable Discretion
As in early American equitable courts, chancellors in Virginia
have broad discretion to dole out justice.2 2 With little statutory
guidance, Virginia practitioners seeking preliminary injunctive
relief often search for judicial direction to flesh out the law, look-
ing for both analogous cases and any evaluative "tests" that
might apply. In Virginia, however, the relevant case law on tem-
226. BRYSON, supra note 223, § 7.05.
227. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-628 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
228. Id. §§ 8.01-624, -625, -629 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
229. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
230. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-631 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
231. See, e.g., id. § 8.01-622 (Repl. Vol. 2015) (addressing an injunction to prevent the
sale, removal, or concealment of specific property until final judgment); id. § 8.01-622.1
(Repl. Vol. 2015) (addressing an injunction to prevent assisted suicide); id. § 8.01-623
(Repl. Vol. 2015) (addressing an injunction against a decree that is subject to a bill of re-
view).
232. Stated differently, even without specific temporary injunction statutes a movant
in these situations likely would be able to satisfy the case law criteria for issuance of a
temporary injunction. Of note, however,
[w]hen a statute empowers a court to grant injunctive relief, the party seek-
ing an injunction is not required to establish the traditional prerequisites,
i.e., irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law, before the in-
junction can issue. All that is required is proof that the statute or regulation
has been violated.
Va. Beach S.P.C.A., Inc. v. S. Hampton Rds. Veterinary Assoc., 229 Va. 349, 354, 329
S.E.2d 10, 13 (1985).
233. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-628 (Repl. Vol. 2015) (requiring only that the court be
satisfied with the plaintiffs equity).
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porary injunctions is sparse."' Because the Supreme Court of
Virginia is particularly reluctant to publish decisions, there are
areas of Virginia law on which the court is silent; when deciding
cases in which there is no applicable Virginia law, Virginia courts
in the past have looked to federal law for guidance.235 Federal
courts deciding cases on which Virginia courts have not weighed
in also sometimes add to the body of case law available to Virgin-
ia practitioners.236 In fact, on occasion federal courts have pro-
nounced, without the benefit of Virginia case law, that federal
law and Virginia law in a given area are similar and have applied
federal law to Virginia cases, as was done with respect to prelim-
inary injunctive relief. '37
A temporary injunction, like a federal preliminary injunction,
is considered an extraordinary remedy.238 While federal courts
were developing their multiple-factor tests to evaluate prelimi-
nary injunctions, Virginia courts evaluating temporary injunc-
tions generally looked at some combination of "the likelihood of
the [movant's] ultimate success on the merits, irreparable injury
to the [movant] should it not be granted or to the [non-movant]
should it be granted, and the existence of an adequate remedy at
common law.""2 9 The requirement to prove both irreparable injury
and inadequacy of a legal remedy is puzzling; as courts and com-
mentators have pointed out, the two elements constitute a dis-
tinction without a difference.' An injury is irreparable because
234. See Davenport & Heslinga, supra note 162, at 4 (noting that during the 30 years
after the Blackwelder decision, "Virginia circuit courts... did not get clear guidance from
the Supreme Court of Virginia, which did not issue an opinion concerning [temporary] in-
junctions.").
235. See, e.g., Heritage Contracting, L.L.C. v. Vasquez, 81 Va. Cir. 161, 165-66 (2010)
(Fairfax County) (whether filing for bankruptcy severed a joint tenancy); Commonwealth
v. Prieto, 75 Va. Cir. 212, 214-18 (2008) (Fairfax County) (whether a presentence inter-
view constitutes a "critical stage" of a criminal proceeding for Sixth Amendment purpos-
es); see also infra Part III.C.
236. See, e.g., In re Anderson, No. 95-15419-SSM, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2480, at 22-25 &
n.15 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Sept. 2, 1997) (whether acceptance and recordation of a deed in lieu
of foreclosure operates as a satisfaction of the underlying indebtedness); In re Meyer, 206
B.R. 410, 415-16 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997) (whether certain transactions constitute fraudu-
lent or voluntary conveyances).
237. See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., MICHIE'S, supra note 221, § 2.
239. See BRYSON, supra note 223, § 7.05 (citing cases).
240. See, e.g., Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 356 n.9
(D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 1 (1974) ("The very thing which makes
an injury 'irreparable' is the fact that no remedy exists to repair it."); Bradfute W. Daven.
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there is no adequate remedy at law, and to require both irrepara-
ble injury and an inadequate legal remedy is redundant.24' A lead-
ing remedies commentator suggests that a better way to view the
two concepts-and to draw a distinction with at least some differ-
ence-is to evaluate whether the injury is irreparable when refer-
ring to the requirement for interim relief pending final judgment,
e.g., when evaluating a temporary injunction, and to evaluate
whether there is an adequate remedy at law when referring to the
choice of remedies at final judgment.242
B. Preserving the Status Quo
Virginia courts, like most federal courts addressing petitions
for preliminary injunctions, both claim that the purpose of a tem-
porary injunction is to preserve the status quo and have a partic-
ulary reluctance to issue mandatory temporary injunctions.243 As
discussed previously, such a declaration has some initial ap-
peal.4' If the movant undertakes to alter the then-existing status
quo via a mandatory injunction, the preliminary injunctive relief
is especially disfavored; if, on the other hand, the movant seeks to
preserve the status quo via a prohibitory injunction, such a situa-
tion arguably is more acceptable.'45 Consistent with this rationale,
the leading commentator on Virginia remedies points out that a
movant must satisfy a higher burden when seeking a mandatory,
as opposed to a prohibitory, temporary injunction,4 6 although he
port, Factors Involved in Granting and Denying Preliminary Injunctions in Virginia State
Courts, 30 THE VA. BAR ASSOC. NEWS J. 8, 9-10 (2004) (discussing cases); see also
LAYCOCK, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 11, at 381 (pointing out that "both phrases
derive from the same history").
241. According to Professor Laycock:
It is hornbook law that equity will not act if there is an adequate remedy at
law .... Another formulation of the rule is that equity will act only to pre-
vent injury that is irreparable-i.e., irreparable at law. Despite occasional at-
tempts to distinguish these statements, they are simply two formulations of
the same rule.
LAYCOCK, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 11, at 380.
242. Id. (citing OWEN M. FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 59 (2d ed. 1984)).
243. See MICHIE'S, supra note 221, § 88; see also COSTELLO, supra note 107, § 13.08
('remporary injunctions are to be issued only in emergency situations, i.e., where the sta-
tus quo between the parties will change materially unless the injunction issues.").
244. See supra Part II.A.
245. See id.
246. See COSTELLO, supra note 107, § 13.08[1] ("If [the movant] requests a mandatory
injunction, a 'strong and imperious necessity' for immediate relief must be shown. This
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apparently recognizes that the distinction may merely be one of
semantics."'
As also discussed previously, there is no justification for differ-
ent burdens incident to the type of preliminary relief sought, as
the definition of the status quo can be manipulated and the non-
movant's liberty is enjoined regardless of the type of injunction
issued.24 s There also is no basis for a bifurcated preliminary in-
junctive relief analysis, where the court both analyzes the impact
of the relief sought on the status quo and applies some separate
preliminary injunction test.2 49 Instead of some talismanic incanta-
tion proclaiming that the purpose of preliminary relief is to main-
tain the status quo, a better introductory statement would be that
"[t]he purpose of the preliminary injunction is to prevent a situa-
tion that will become irremediable due to the time it takes to pre-
pare for [the permanent injunction] trial,""2 ' and then rely on a
temporary injunction test to analyze whether preliminary injunc-
tive relief serves this purpose. In short, there is no need to refer
to the status quo in a proper temporary injunction test.
C. Virginia Courts Look to Federal Law
In the absence of specific guidance from the Virginia legislature
and the Supreme Court of Virginia, courts within the Common-
wealth handed down temporary injunction decisions that lacked
consistency."' In 1988, when evaluating a federal preliminary in-
necessity is substantially more than the irreparable injury which is the typical subject of
the basic petition for injunction. It is also more than an averment that the defendant is
about to disturb the status quo between the parties before the court can reach the underly-
ing action which is the usual standard for entry of a prohibitory temporary injunction."
(quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. Echols, 117 Va. 182, 184, 83 S.E. 1082, 1083 (1915))); see also
BRYSON, supra note 223, § 7.05 ("Only in the rare and most compelling case will a judge
grant a mandatory [temporary] injunction." (citing Echols, 117 Va. at 184-85, 83 S.E. at
1083; Carpenter v. Gold, 88 Va. 551, 14 S.E. 329 (1892))); MICHIE'S, supra note 221, § 88
("The courts are more loathe to grant preliminary mandatory injunctions than prohibitory
ones, and the former will only be awarded in cases of strong and imperious necessity.").
247. See COSTELLO, supra note 107, § 13.08[l] ("Counsel can ask that defendant be re-
quired to dam his creek or, more wisely, that defendant be prohibited from further flood-
ing of [the movant's] land.").
248. See supra Part II.A.
249. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
250. Denlow, supra note 1, at 537.
251. See Davenport, supra note 240, at 8 ("In Virginia state courts, the law concerning
the award of temporary injunctions is muddy. The problem arises from the lack of a clear
statutory or judicial pronouncement on the standards to be applied.").
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junction related to an underlying claim that the defendant had
violated a Virginia statute, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit stated, "there is no great difference between
federal and Virginia standards for preliminary injunctions" and
"[b]oth draw upon the same equitable principles."'52 Significantly,
the Supreme Court of Virginia has never affirmed this ap-
proach,"' although many Virginia courts implicitly have relied on
the Fourth Circuit's proclamation54 and have applied federal pre-
liminary injunction law when analyzing Virginia temporary in-
junctions.5 ' Notably, Virginia trial court judges are provided a
reference source that clearly endorses this practice.256
As the evolution of preliminary injunction law within the fed-
eral circuit courts of appeals progressed, the Fourth Circuit de-
cided Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville, Inc. v. Seilig Man-
ufacturing Co. in 1977.257 In light of the absence of clarity in
Virginia temporary injunction law,258 the lack of Supreme Court of
Virginia precedent that Virginia can look to federal law when
Virginia law is silent, and the Fourth Circuit's declaration that
252. Capital Tool and Mfg. v. Maschinefabrik Herkules, 837 F.2d 171, 173 (4th Cir.
1988).
253. See Davenport, supra note 240, at 8 & n.6.
254. See, e.g., Fettig v. Touchstone Dev., 54 Va. Cir. 357, 358 (2001) (Loudoun County);
Goldbecker v. Fairfax Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 37 Va. Cir. 584, 586 n.2 (1994) (Spotsylva-
nia County); Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Corp., 28 Va.
Cir. 220, 221-22 (1992) (Charlottesville City).
255. See infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
256. See VIRGINIA CIVIL BENCHBOOK, supra note 223, § 8.06[3][b] (citing Winter and
outlining the Winter preliminary injunction test in the section covering evaluation of tem-
porary injunctions). The Benchbook is a reference text, produced by Virginia circuit court
judges at the direction of the Virginia Supreme Court, that is provided to Virginia circuit
court judges as a resource. Id. at iii. Pre- Winter editions of the Benchbook cited Blackweld-
er and outlined the Blackwelder preliminary injunction test. See, e.g., 1-7 VIRGINIA CIVIL
BENCHBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS § VI[C] [2] (2008-09 ed. Matthew Bender).
257. 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977); see supra Part II.B.2.
258. See, e.g., Profl Heating and Cooling, Inc. v. Donald G. Smith and Freedom Mech.,
Inc., 64 Va. Cir. 313, 314 (2004) (Norfolk City) ("I am not aware of any decision of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia on the issue."); Danville Historic Neighborhood Assn. v. City of
Danville, 64 Va. Cir. 83, 83 (2004) (Danville City) (noting that "the state Supreme Court
has not yet delineated the standard to be applied in granting or denying a preliminary in-
junction"); HotJobs.com v. Digital City, Inc., 53 Va. Cir. 36, 39 (2000) (Fairfax County)
(pointing out that "the Virginia Supreme Court has not set forth standards for granting or
denying a preliminary injunction"); Christian Def. Fund v. Stephen Winchell & Assocs.,
Inc., 47 Va. Cir. 148, 149 (1998) (Fairfax County) ("The Virginia Supreme Court has not
yet decided a case that delineates the standards to be applied in granting or denying a pre-
liminary injunction."); Seniors Coal., Inc. v. Seniors Found., Inc., 39 Va. Cir. 344, 349
(1996) (Fairfax County) (same).
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federal and Virginia standards for preliminary relief are similar,
numerous Virginia circuit courts adopted the Blackwelder test.59
After Blackwelder was decided, Virginia preliminary injunctive
relief law unfortunately remained confused.26 ° Several Virginia
circuit courts subsequently cited to the preliminary injunction
test enunciated in Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton,2 1 alt-
hough Rum Creek Coal simply relied on Blackwelder,262 and some
courts relied on the prior inconsistent Supreme Court of Virginia
263cases.
259. See, e.g., Midgette v. Arlington Props., 83 Va. Cir. 26, 28 (2011) (Chesapeake City);
Owens v. City Council, 75 Va. Cir. 91, 101 (2008) (Norfolk City); Long & Foster Real Es-
tate, Inc. v. CLPF-King St. Venture, L.P., 74 Va. Cir. 87, 89 (2007) (Alexandria City); S.
Auburn, L.P. v. Old Auburn Mills, L.P., 68 Va. Cir. 145, 145 (2005) (Loudoun County); Int'l
Limousine Serv., Inc. v. Reston Limousine & Travel Serv., 68 Va. Cir. 84, 85-86 (2005)
(Loudoun County); Hardinge, Inc. v. Buhler, 72 Va. Cir. 39, 39 (2006) (Amherst County);
Wilson v. Henry Cty. Zoning Appeals Bd., 68 Va. Cir. 317, 317-18 (2005) (Henry County)
(citing Child Evangelism v. Montgomery County, 373 F.3d 589, 593 (4th Cir. 2004) and E.
Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828 (4th Cir. 2004) (which "follow[ed] Black-
welder"); Villalobos v. City of Norfolk, 62 Va. Cir. 158, 158-59 (2003) (Norfolk City); Dem-
ocratic Party of Va. v. State Bd. of Elections, 1999 Va. Cir. LEXIS 551, at *4 (1999) (Rich-
mond City); Cubic Toll Sys., Inc. v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 37 Va. Cir. 522, 522 (1993)
(Fairfax County); In re Smith, 1999 Va. Cir. LEXIS 743, at *5-6 (1999) (Loudoun County);
Newell Indus. Corp. v. Lineal Techs., 43 Va. Cir. 412, 413 (1997) (Roanoke City); MFS
Network Techs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. Cir. 406, 408-09 (1994) (Richmond
City); Plate v. Kincannon Place Condo. Unit Owners' Ass'n Bd. of Dirs., 30 Va. Cir. 323,
325 (1993) (Fairfax County).
260. See Davenport, supra note 240, at 8 ("Virginia circuit courts have therefore...
been left largely to their own devices and have applied conflicting tests to requests for re-
lief. The result has been an uneven analysis of requests for temporary injunctions, based
on circuit courts' use of principles applicable to permanent injunctions in state courts or
temporary injunctions in federal courts.").
261. 926 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1991), overruled by The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), affd, The Real Truth About Obama,
Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); see, e.g., Danville
Historic Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Danville, 64 Va. Cir. 83, 83-84 (2004) (Danville
City); SmartMail Servs. v. Ellis, 66 Va. Cir. 507, 509 (2003) (Chesterfield County); Am-
Cor.Com, Inc. v. Stevens, 56 Va. Cir. 245, 250 (2001) (Warren County); Fund for Animals
v. State Bd. of Elections, 53 Va. Cir. 405, 407 (2000) (Richmond City); HotJobs.com v. Digi-
tal City, Inc., 53 Va. Cir. 36, 39 (2000) (Fairfax County); Riverton Inv. Corp. v. Econ. Dev.
Auth., 50 Va. Cir. 404, 411 (1999) (Warren County); Christian Def. Fund v. Winchell &
Assocs., Inc., 47 Va. Cir. 148, 149 (1998) (Fairfax County); Seniors Coal., Inc. v. Seniors
Found., Inc., 39 Va. Cir. 344, 349 (1996) (Fairfax County).
262. See Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 346 ("[I]n Rum Creek Coal, we reiterated [the Black-
welder standard] that the 'hardship balancing test applies to determine the granting or
denial of a preliminary injunction."') (quoting Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc., 926 F.2d at
359)).
263. See, e.g., Goldbecker v. Fairfax Cty. Bd. of Sup'rs, 37 Va. Cir. 584, 586 (1994)
(Fairfax County) (citing Virginia cases requiring the movant to show "a reasonable likeli-
hood of succeeding on the merits of the case" and that he "will suffer irreparable harm un-
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With Virginia circuit courts more and more frequently relying
upon federal preliminary injunction law to decide temporary in-
junction cases, the Supreme Court of Virginia was afforded the
opportunity to expressly condone or reject this approach in 2008.
In Levisa Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., a mineral estate
owner sought a temporary injunction to prevent a competing min-
ing company from storing the competing company's excess water
on other property.264 By the time the case worked its way to the
state supreme court, the issue of a temporary injunction was
moot, and the court instead remanded the case for possible issu-
ance of a permanent injunction.265 The court noted in a footnote
that the non-movant in lower court had urged application of the
Blackwelder test; the court then stated: "In the posture of this
appeal it is not necessary to address that issue, and we express
no view upon the matter."'266 Instead of opining regarding Virginia
courts' reliance on federal law, the Supreme Court of Virginia de-
liberately declined to express its opinion on the subject. The court
did, however, reiterate some "well established principles" regard-
ing temporary injunctions, citing only Virginia case law, for the
propositions that "the granting of an injunction is an extraordi-
nary remedy and rests on sound judicial discretion to be exercised
upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of a particu-
lar case,"'267 and that "unless a party is entitled to an injunction
pursuant to a statute, a party must establish the 'traditional pre-
requisites, i.e., irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy
at law' before a request for injunctive relief will be sustained.""6
Despite receiving no guidance from the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, Virginia circuit courts continued to apply the Fourth Cir-
cuit's Blackwelder preliminary injunction analysis to proposed
less the injunction is granted and that [he has] no adequate remedy at law"); Health and
Racquet Club, Inc. v. Fitness Today of Charlottesville, 29 Va. Cir. 61, 70 (1992) (Albemarle
County) (citing a Virginia case requiring the movant to "demonstrate that the injury
which it would suffer if the injunction were not granted would be grievous and material
and would not be adequately reparable in money damages"). As one commentator notes,
"While many Virginia circuit courts purport to adhere to the Blackwelder test, some courts
nevertheless apply their own unique standards in determining whether to grant relief."
Davenport, supra note 240, at 9.
264. 276 Va. 44, 662 S.E.2d. 44 (2008).
265. Id. at 60, 63, 662 S.E.2d at 53-54.
266. Id. at 60 n.6, 662 S.E.2d at 53, n.6.
267. Id. at 60, 662 S.E.2d at 53.
268. Id. at 61, 662 S.E.2d at 53 (quoting Va. Beach S.P.C.A., Inc. v. S. Hampton Rds.
Veterinary Assoc., 229 Va. 349, 354, 329 S.E.2d. 10, 13 (1985)).
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temporary injunctions.269 Since the Fourth Circuit decided Real
Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission, which
interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Winter v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc. and rejected the Blackwelder
sliding-scale approach,270 most Virginia courts have evaluated
temporary injunctions using the Real Truth sequential analysis.27'
Consistent with this, Virginia judges presented with petitions for
temporary injunctions currently are referred to the Winter four-
factor test and instructed to apply the test sequentially, as the
Fourth Circuit did in Real Truth.272
IV. A RECOMMENDED APPROACH TOWARD VIRGINIA TEMPORARY
INJUNCTION LAW
Although Virginia courts often have relied on Fourth Circuit
preliminary injunction law, litigants and judges understandably
are unsure whether this is a sound practice in light of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia's decision not to endorse or prohibit the
practice.273 If the Supreme Court of Virginia ultimately rejects re-
269. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
270. 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), afr'd, The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
271. See, e.g., Wings, LLC v. Capitol Leather, LLC, 88 Va. Cir. 83, 89 (2014) (Fairfax
County); McEachin v. Bolling, 84 Va. Cir. 76, 77 (2011) (Richmond City); Strong Found.
Youth Initiative LLC v. Ashford, 2009 Va. Cir. LEXIS 140, at *1 (2009) (Richmond City).
Of note, several Virginia treatises still improperly cite to Blackwelder and to cases that
relied on Blackwelder. See, e.g., MICHIE'S, supra note 221, § 88; COSTELLO, supra note 107,
§ 13.08[1]; but see id. n.107 (noting, in a recently added footnote, that the author's discus-
sion of Blackwelder "should be considered in light of... Winter").
272. VIRGINIA CIVIL BENCHBOOK, supra note 223, § 8.06[31[b] (citing Winter v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008)). According to the Benchbook:
The four factors should be applied using the following principles:
[A] Each of the four requirements must be satisfied as articulated;
[B] All four factors must be clearly shown;
[C] The balance-of-hardship (as in Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig
Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977) is no longer to be applied);
[D] There is no adjustment to the requirements by balancing them un-
der a relaxed standard;
[E] Emphasis is placed on the public interest requirement by directing
that particular regard for public consequences hould be paid.
Id. § 8.06[3][b][iii.
273. As one Virginia commentator remarked: "I have the sense that more than one
such state-court judge has fumed over the apparent refusal of the Supreme Court o issue
an opinion that lets trial judges know how they're supposed to decide such requests." L.
Steven Emmert, Virginia's Standard for Granting Preliminary Injunctions (Why Isn't
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liance on federal law, Virginia temporary injunction law still will
be unsettled based on existing state law. Courts invariably would
embark on a quixotic quest through a quagmire of equitable prin-
ciples and analyses involving some combination of a movant's
likelihood of success on the merits, irreparability of injury with-
out preliminary relief, and-despite the redundancy-adequacy of
a legal remedy. If, on the other hand, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia endorses the practice of adopting federal preliminary in-
junction law, it is not clear on what federal law Virginia courts
should rely with respect to both the role of preserving the status
quo and interpretation of the four-part test enunciated in Winter.
Courts might apply a separate test to evaluate preservation of the
status quo, might or might not apply a heightened standard for
mandatory injunctions, and could choose to apply the traditional
four factors either sequentially or using some variant of a sliding-
scale test. Although one could argue that the absence of a clear
test for issuance of a Virginia temporary injunction preserves the
court's traditional broad equitable powers, such judicial discretion
does little to guide litigants and the courts. As one Virginia appel-
late attorney commented, although there may be "benefits of flex-
ibility in some instances,... a set of established rules would be
significantly better for bench and bar than is the current state of
uncertainty."274
With these considerations in mind, progress toward a proposed
test for Virginia temporary injunctions is possible. Presenting an
opportunity for the Supreme Court of Virginia to implement such
a test is a bit more problematic, however. The dearth of Virginia
appellate temporary injunction law is partly explained by Virgin-
ia procedure, which primarily produces unpublished decisions in
this area of the law because temporary injunction appeals-if not
mooted due to time sensitivity-are not heard by the entire
court.27 Virginia appellate attorney Steve Emmert nevertheless
There One?) (Aug. 13, 2013), virginia-appeals.com/virginias-standard-for-temporary-injunc
tions/#ve3yk7xviko (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Emmert, Virginia's Standard].
274. See id.
275. See L. Steven Emmert, The Other Shoe Drops-Fourth Circuit Jettisons Black-
welder (Aug. 6, 2009), virginia-appeals.comlfourth-circuit-jettisons-blackwelder#ve3x2rx
viko (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) ("[T]he reason there's not much temporary-injunction
caselaw on the Virginia books is procedural, not philosophical; such injunctions are always
evaluated by a panel of three justices, not by the entire court. Hence those orders are vir-
tually always unpublished.").
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lays out some possible pathways for promulgation of a test for
Virginia temporary injunctions: (1) the Supreme Court of Virginia
could elect to consider a petition for review of a temporary injunc-
tion as a full court and opt to publish the decision; (2) the court
could promulgate a rule for inclusion in the Rules of Supreme
Court of Virginia that expressly articulates the standard; or (3)
although not preferred, the legislature could enact a statute that
pronounces the standard.276 Given the current uncertainties, the
Supreme Court of Virginia-via case law or rule-should consider
adopting a test for Virginia temporary injunctions.
A. Federal Preliminary Injunction Law Should Serve as a
Starting Point for a Virginia Temporary Injunction Law Test
In establishing a test for issuance of Virginia temporary injunc-
tions, the Supreme Court of Virginia should look to federal pre-
liminary injunction jurisprudence as a starting point, as the ap-
plicable federal case law is fully developed, the analysis is well
reasoned, and the goals and procedures of preliminary injunc-
tions are analogous to those of temporary injunctions. The long-
established four factors by which federal preliminary injunctions
are evaluated make a great deal of sense, despite being inconsist-
ently applied by the federal circuit courts of appeals, and those
factors, therefore, should form the basis for a Virginia temporary
injunction test. Additionally, application of a four-factor test
would not diminish the equitable reach of the court or the tradi-
tional discretion afforded chancellors; rather, such a test would
simply provide a framework upon which equitable principles
could be applied in a consistent, logical, and arguably predictable
277manner.
276. Emmert, Virginia's Standard, supra note 273. According to Emmert, legislative
action is not the preferred route for establishing a temporary injunction test because, at
least in his experience, "when the legislature micromanages the courts' decision-making
process (as contrasted with matters of civil procedure, for example), you often get unin-
tended consequences." Id.
277. Compare supra note 239 and accompanying text (the traditional equitable criteria
test applied by Virginia courts) with supra note 132 and accompanying text (the Winter
four-factor test); see also Vaughn, supra note 89, at 870 ('The optimal standard is based on
a theory of bounded discretion .... [T]his standard allows the judge flexibility and discre-
tion within the confines of a uniform standard, the terms of which have been openly de-
fined to cover only the legitimate concerns of decisionmaking.").
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Such a four-factor preliminary injunctive test should be applied
as a sequential test-as the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals did
in Real Truth-because that is arguably the most faithful reading
of Winter, and it is consistent with the accepted principle that
preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy.27 Such a
sequential test requires evaluation of each of the four factors sep-
arately, thereby making reference to the Leubsdorf/Posner formu-
lation unnecessary."' Aligning the Virginia temporary injunction
and the Fourth Circuit preliminary injunction analyses also
would result in consistent state and federal preliminary injunc-
tive relief standards in Virginia."' The Virginia test, through its
wording, should reflect Winter's admonition that a movant must
make "a clear showing" that extraordinary relief is warranted."'
Within the four-factor test, "is likely" therefore should be inter-
preted consistent with its plain meaning, i.e., greater than 50%.
With respect to Virginia courts' evaluation of both irreparable in-
jury and inadequacy of a legal remedy, the irreparable injury
prong of the four-part test subsumes an inadequate-remedy-at-
law analysis, making separate irreparability and inadequacy in-
quiries unnecessary."'
B. A Recommended Test for Virginia Temporary Injunctions
In light of the above, formulation of a recommended test for is-
suance of Virginia temporary injunctions is possible. Contrary to
current guidance, a Virginia court's analysis of preliminary in-
junctive relief should be independent of whether the movant is
seeking a mandatory or prohibitory injunction; there should be no
separate burden of proof. In fact, an evaluation of the status quo
need not be conducted at all because there is no need for a sepa-
rate "status quo" test. If Virginia courts want to continue to artic-
ulate a "purpose" for temporary injunctions, such a purpose
278. See supra Part II.B.3.c.
279. Although recognizing that Virginia courts rely on federal preliminary injunction
law when evaluating Virginia temporary injunctions, Professor Costello in his book on
Virginia remedies continues to discuss the Leubsdorf-Posner formula, which arguably is
inapplicable to a sequential test such as that adopted by the Fourth Circuit in The Real
Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission. See COSTELLO, supra note 107,
§ 13.08[1].
280. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
281. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).
282. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
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should be re-fashioned to indicate that a temporary injunction is
designed-via evaluation using the four-factor test-to minimize
the irreparable harm to the parties until completion of a trial on
the merits.
Under the recommended Virginia temporary injunction test,
the movant must establish that: (1) he has more than a 50% like-
lihood of succeeding at the trial on the merits, i.e., receiving a
permanent injunction; (2) he has more than a 50% probability of
suffering irreparable harm prior to the trial on the merits if the
temporary injunction is not granted; (3) the harm to the movant
prior to the trial on the merits if the temporary injunction is not
granted is greater than the harm to the non-movant prior to the
trial on the merits if the temporary injunction is granted; and (4)
the public interest does not outweigh the possible irreparable
harm to the movant prior to the trial on the merits if the tempo-
rary injunction is not granted.
CONCLUSION
Equity has played an important role in American jurispru-
dence, and it continues to serve as an effective weapon in the liti-
gator's arsenal. The chancellor's discretion to fashion remedies
unique to the circumstances, based on what he or she perceives to
be fair and just, often is needed to address complex situations in
which there is no adequate remedy at law. Although equitable
discretion is important, its flexibility must be balanced with some
degree of predictability and consistency. Virginia litigants seek-
ing preliminary injunctive relief-what the courts have deemed to
be an extraordinary remedy-have a particularly strong argu-
ment for such predictability in the interests of efficiency, uni-
formity, and the liberty interests at stake.
A four-part test is used to decide whether to issue federal pre-
liminary injunctions. Although judicial application of the four fac-
tors has been inconsistent despite some guidance from the Su-
preme Court of the United States, the various approaches taken
by federal circuit courts of appeals highlight options for jurisdic-
tions-like Virginia-that have yet to formulate a test for evalu-
ating preliminary injunctive relief."3 Although some Virginia
283. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 50:273
VIRGINIA TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS
courts have used the preliminary injunction test adopted by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit when eval-
uating petitions for Virginia temporary injunctions, the Supreme
Court of Virginia has not endorsed this approach.8 4
Faced with uncertainty regarding whether the application of
federal preliminary injunction law is proper and the lack of a con-
sistent Virginia approach to evaluating temporary injunctions,
Virginia litigants are ill-equipped to serve their clients properly.
Clear guidance for issuance of Virginia temporary injunctions is
needed. When presented with the proper opportunity, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia should consider articulating how Virgin-
ia trial courts should evaluate petitions for temporary injunc-
tions. The temporary injunction test proposed in this article (the
"Proposed Test") is modeled after the preliminary injunction test
adopted by the Fourth Circuit. The Proposed Test is consistent
with the purpose of temporary injunctions, is independent of any
effect on the status quo between the parties, and is faithful to
guidance provided by the Supreme Court of the United States re-
garding analysis of preliminary injunctive relief. The Proposed
Test therefore is a solid candidate for consideration by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia and, if adopted, will guide both litigants
and Virginia courts when evaluating Virginia temporary injunc-
tions.
284. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
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